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AARON DILDAY  
 
(Under the Direction of William T. Allison) 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Second World War forced American politicians to reevaluate the nation's security 
preparedness. This resulted in the National Security Act of 1947, which, among many things, 
created the National Security Council and an ad hoc system for American strategy-making. The 
Cold War revealed many of the deficiencies in this strategy-making system. The Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sought to reform the nation's 
defense establishment to meet the evolving needs of the Cold War; part of this included revision 
of strategic development. Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols required the president to annually 
submit to Congress a national security strategy report and it established guidelines for how to 
construct proper strategy. This thesis analyzes the National Security Strategies of Ronald 
Reagan, George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush to determine whether or 
not Section 603 effectively provided guidance to these presidents in creating strategic plans and 
if it led to a coherent method of strategic development. To accomplish this, strategic theory is 
discussed and a rubric, titled "Tenets of Strategic Planning," is created to evaluate each National 
Security Strategy. This thesis contends that presidents have been successful in following the 
rudimentary principles established by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act as well as the 
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more stringent guidelines of the Tenets of Strategic Planning to regularly produce proper 
strategic plans. 
 
INDEX WORDS: National Security Strategy, Strategy, United States National Security, United 
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NOTE ON CITATIONS 
 
Notation references for National Security Strategies will receive a full citation for the first 
reference to each unique National Security Strategy in each chapter. However, on successive 
citations in the same chapter the format will be truncated as the example below demonstrates. 
 
Format: President’s Last Name, NSS, Year, Page Number.  
Example: Bush, NSS, 1991, 27. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 
NMS National Military Strategy 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NSA  National Security Act of 1947 
NSC National Security Council 
NSS National Security Strategy 
SDI  Strategic Defense Initiative 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) 
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The consequence of politicians pretending that policy is strategy and of soldiers focusing 
on operations has been to leave strategy without a home.  
—Hew Strachan, “Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq” 
 
Among its many sweeping reforms, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 refocused the relationship between military advisors and civilian 
leadership.
1
 Goldwater-Nichols, as the legislation is commonly known, established a streamlined 
system of advisement to better serve the needs of the president, but more importantly it required 
that the president continually reevaluate national security objectives and delineate how to 
achieve them in an annually-prepared National Security Strategy report, or NSS. Military 
historian Hew Strachan succinctly described this process: “the principle purpose of effective 
civil-military relations is national security; its output is strategy.”2 The primary purpose of 
requiring the president to annually report to Congress is to explain the state of national security 
through a written articulation of an NSS. A thorough discussion of strategy and analysis of 
American strategic planning since World War II demonstrates that NSSs are properly 
constructed strategic plans, adhering to the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols. The proposed 
Tenets of Strategic Planning will be used to assess the NSSs against their intended purpose. 
If the president is indeed the supreme strategist of the land and thus directed by law to 
develop an annual NSS, has Congress, through Goldwater-Nichols, guided the president on how 




planning year-to-year? Do all of the National Security Strategies qualify as proper strategic 
plans?  
Goldwater-Nichols successfully established guidelines to direct presidents to create 
properly formatted strategic plans. When they are published, the majority of the National 
Security Strategies fulfill the requisite principles needed to be considered strategy. Though 
certain presidents have been better than others at establishing proper strategy, they all by-and-
large have been successful in following the rudimentary principles established by Section 603 of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act as well as the more stringent guidelines of the Tenets of Strategic 
Planning set forth in this thesis.  
Chapter 2, "On Strategy," discusses the theory of strategy and how that evolves into 
practical applications as strategic planning. Theory is melded into a definition of national 
strategy, which is a framework for applying all of the national resources available to achieve 
large political purposes directed against an opponent through war and peace. From this 
definition, several essential elements necessary for a properly constructed strategic plan are 
erected into a framework of analysis; these elements comprise the Tenets of Strategic Planning. 
The Tenets of Strategic Planning focus on the core of strategy—means and ends. The first tenet 
requires that a proper strategic plan explicitly defines objectives and correlating means. The 
second tenet also concerns objectives, requiring that the strategic plan include both short-term 
and long-term objectives; true strategy looks beyond the current conflict to the peace ahead. The 
third tenet, harkening back to the definition of strategy, focuses on means, dictating that 
strategists should look beyond military force and utilize all available resources for obtaining the 
objectives. The fourth tenet builds upon the first, declaring that proper strategy take into account 




strategic plan, especially in democratic states, should consider public opinion. The sixth tenet 
observes that strategic planning does not occur in a vacuum, and should therefore acknowledge 
the activities of outside actors. The final tenet notes that there will always be friction and 
uncertainty; therefore a strategic plan should be flexible and adaptable over time and to changing 
circumstances. The chapter then concludes by comparing the Tenets of Strategic Planning to the 
defined parameters of an NSS as set forth by Congress. 
 Chapters 3 through 6 depart from the theoretical discussion of strategy found in Chapter 2 
for more practical application. These chapters apply the Tenets of Strategic Planning to the 
National Security Strategies of Presidents Ronald Reagan through George W. Bush, with each 
chapter discussing the overall vision that each president attempted to establish. Chapter 3 looks 
at how President Ronald Reagan first attempted to interpret the new law and analyzes his version 
of Cold War containment. Chapter 4 investigates President George H. W. Bush’s “New World 
Order” and whether or not he was able to construct an effective strategic plan around his 
principles of internationalism. Chapter 5 delves into President William Clinton’s post-Cold War 
vision of “engagement and enlargement” and how he attempted to integrate domestic politics and 
an economic focus into a national strategy. Chapter 6 looks into how President George W. Bush 
took a radically different approach to the Goldwater-Nichols Act by incorporating interventionist 
policies designed to protect America in a post-9/11 world. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by 
discerning trends in strategic planning, identifying successes and failures, and speculating on the 
future of American national strategy and how future administrations will interpret Goldwater-
Nichols. However, before looking to the future, the discussion must return to the beginning of 




A second world war caught the United States underprepared for its call to action and the 
subsequent war brought many of the existing problems in the military establishment to light. 
Notably, the United States lacked a coherent strategy-making system to guide the war effort. 
President Franklin Roosevelt ran the war out of the oval office and created an ad hoc Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, comprised of Navy admirals Ernest King and William Leahy and Army generals Chief 
of Staff George Marshall and Chief of the Army Air Forces Hap Arnold, to advise him on 
matters of national strategy.
3
 This arrangement resulted in a confused (yet surprisingly effective) 
American wartime strategy. However, once the war ended, the United States had to confront 
some of the central national security problems that arose during the war: competition instead of 
coordination between the Departments of the Army and Navy; a need for an independent Air 
Force; and strained civil-military relations from a lack of systematic advisement to the president 
on strategy and military matters.
4
 Essentially, the United States needed a process to guide 
strategic development and advisement to the president. The National Security Act of 1947 
represented the first step towards an effective strategy-making system.
5
  
The National Security Act sought “to promote the national security by providing for a 
Secretary of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a 
Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the 
activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the 
Government concerned with the national security.”6 The National Security Act implemented 
these goals through creating: an independent Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; a Secretary of 
Defense to oversee the new Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Central 
Intelligence Agency; and the National Security Council. Establishing this new structure 




Specialist in national security policy Charles A. Stevenson remarked on the ironies of the 
National Security Act of 1947 noting that it “arose as a measure to reorganize the military, yet it 
became basic law for foreign policy and for the intelligence community. It was crafted as a 
means to impose restraints on military spending, yet it provided the framework for the Cold War 
military buildup.”7 For all of its ironies, the 1947 law represented the beginning for further 
refinement in the strategy-making process. 
 The National Security Act also created the National Security Council (NSC), which 
serves as an advisory body under the direction of the president. The National Security Act 
delegated a specific mission to the NSC, stating that “the function of the Council shall be to 
advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies 
relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments 
and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national 
security.”8 The advisement role of the council often resulted in strategic recommendations, 
released as strategy reports. Several of these memoranda established a cohesive direction for 
national strategy. One of the most important of these early documents was “NSC-68: United 
States Objectives and Programs for National Security.”9  
Inspiration for the basic concepts in NSC-68 can be traced back to George Kennan’s 
“Long Telegram” of 1946, publicly released a year later as the famous “X” article.10 Kennan’s 
article introduced the public to the term, and underdeveloped concept of, containment.
11
 
Kennan’s concept of containment concluded that the United States faced limited capabilities for 
confronting the Soviet threat. Therefore, priorities of interest needed to be established with the 
United States focusing on spheres of vital importance.
12
 Furthermore, historian John Lewis 




expansionism, and that communism posed a threat only to the extent that it was the instrument of 
that expansion.”13 In 1947, Kennan did not expect the Soviet Union to risk war (more 
specifically offensive military operations beyond Soviet borders) for Soviet expansionist 
policies; however, he cautioned that it must remain an accounted possibility in American 
strategic planning.
14
 Overall, the Soviet Union need not be destroyed, but could coexist with the 
United States in a balance-of-power/sphere-of-influence system where the United States sought 
to contain the ideological spread of communism from vital industrial power centers peripheral to 
the Soviet sphere of influence.
15
 However, international events would soon force the 
administration of President Harry Truman to veer from Kennan’s original strategy of 
containment. 
After shocking events in 1949 – China’s fall to communism, the Soviet Union’s 
successful atomic bomb test, and the ever-growing list of international responsibilities of the 
United States against its apparently limited resources – President Truman realized the need for 
action. Early in 1950, Truman authorized the development of a “single, comprehensive statement 
of interests, threats, and feasible responses, capable of being communicated throughout the 
bureaucracy.”16 The resulting document was NSC-68, written by the National Security Council 
without Kennan’s direct participation, but certainly drawing from Kennan’s ideas presented in 
the Long Telegram and the “X” article. 
The National Security Council Report expanded upon Kennan’s basic concept of 
containment. The document concurred with Kennan that Soviet expansionism should be 
checked. However, NSC-68 radically deviated from Kennan’s ideas by declaring that the 
strongpoint defense would no longer suffice – the United States should instead pursue a strategy 




considered vital, not just the limited number of military-industrial power centers.
17
 Led by Paul 
H. Nitze, Kennan’s successor as Director of Policy Planning at the State Department and chair of 
the ad hoc committee responsible for producing NSC-68, the authors of NSC-68 justified this 
pivotal change in approach through two essential arguments. First, that the perceived balance of 
power held by foreign and domestic mass opinion was just as important to American security as 
the actual balance.
18
 Second, that American resources were not quite so limited, and that the 
government could stimulate the economy through defense spending and accept short-term 
deficits until increased tax revenues from the expanding economy accrued. The designers of 
NSC-68 intended for this expansion of the gross national product to be utilized for increased 
military expenditures in order to accomplish the peripheral strategy they proposed.
19
 
The peripheral strategy, supported through an unprecedented military buildup, was 
instrumental to NSC strategic thinking at the time. The council viewed the coming Soviet threat 
as equally unprecedented, stating that “the issues that face us are momentous, involving the 
fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself.”20  NSC-68 declared 
that the Soviet plan dictated extension of Soviet authority and “the ultimate elimination of any 
effective opposition to their authority.”21 Ultimately, the NSC believed that this would culminate 
in a clash between the Soviet Union and United States: “The United States, as the principal 
center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is 
the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or 
another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.”22 The crafters of NSC-68 believed 
that the Soviet Union was working towards a cross-over point at which the Soviets would have 
sufficient military capabilities to defeat the United States. They estimated that this point would 




immense destruction upon the Unites States. Also, Nitze and his team accepted as true that the 
Soviet Union already possessed sufficient conventional forces to threaten the interests of the 
United States and its allies, especially in Western Europe.
23
 Furthermore, if the United States did 
not build up its own forces, the Soviet Union might indeed risk war through a surprise attack.
24
 
Considering the probability of a Soviet attack and eventuality of Soviet dominance if the 
United States remained dormant, Nitze and his cadre of national security advisors sought to 
formulate options for an American response. Diplomatically, they sought to develop an 
international community that would help tip the balance of power, in terms of international 
opinion and support, to the United States.
25
 However, NSC-68’s authors also noted that the most 
essential component of national power for implementing the policy of containment was military 
strength. Without obtaining a position of superior military strength, containment amounted to no 
more than a bluff.
26
 Additionally, the document outlined the economic means that needed to be 
incorporated into this national strategy to facilitate such a military buildup as would be necessary 
to outpace the Soviet Union.
27
 This resulted in an American national strategy that fulfilled the 
definition by looking beyond military power to other aspects of national power during a period 
of intense, but not direct, hostility. 
 In addition to its innovative strategic vision, NSC-68 is highly regarded as a coherent 
strategic plan. John Lewis Gaddis commented that “NSC 68 represented something new in the 
American political-military experience: It was nothing less than an attempt to set down in the 
unforgiving medium of cold type a comprehensive statement of what United States national 
security policy should be. Nothing this daring had ever been attempted before.”28 The “daring” 
of the NSC in creating a strategic plan combined with its remarkable vision of basing its strategy 




time in American history a coherent written articulation of national strategy. The strategic plan 
they produced grew from the post-war need for strategic direction and Kennan’s innovational 
theory of containment. NSC-68 outlined a national strategy that identified American interests 
and threats to American national security, and drew a plan to manage both according to ends, 
means, and capabilities. However, for all of its advances in strategic planning, American 
strategy-making was still an ad hoc process; no mechanism existed to regularize strategic 
development.  
American strategic development, though inconsistent, appeared to function well for the 
beginning of the Cold War. Yet, as the Cold War became more complex and the American 
defense establishment became more entrenched and territorial, the 1947 system began to break 
down. The ten year war in Vietnam, the failed 1980 Iranian hostage rescue attempt, and the 1983 
invasion of Grenada brought some of the problems still remaining in the system to light – the 
need to limit defense spending; the lack of coordination among the services; and the need to 
further refine how the United States approached strategic planning. These issues led many in the 
early 1980s to question American strategic thinking and whether or not the United States could 
adequately fulfill its Cold War leadership role. 
On November 7, 1982, a New York Times article written by the former Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff David C. Jones identified several major problems existing in the 
Department of Defense and national security structure: “to sum up, our defense establishment 
suffers serious deficiencies, including the following: Strategy is so all-encompassing as to mean 
all things to all men. Long-range planning is relegated to a back seat. Leaders are inevitably 
captives of the urgent, and long-range planning is too often neglected.”29 While it was apparent 




whirlwind of controversy and helped spur public debate and congressional investigations into the 
nation’s military and defense structure. Senator Barry Goldwater, a veteran of World War II and 
strong supporter of the American military, publicly supported the former chair’s arguments, 
adding “in my opinion, we need a central organization to plan overall strategy and tactics and to 
plan the weaponry needed for these functions. This group should direct the different members of 
the defense establishment as to exactly what their roles will be.”30  
Congressional staffer James Locher later joined Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn 
on the new Task Force on Defense Organization, a committee of nine senators and staff members 
working towards creating a bill for correcting problems in the defense establishment. On June 
27, 1985, Locher led a briefing for the task force. In Victory on the Potomac, Locher later 
recalled that at the briefing he had “presented considerable evidence on the JCS’s inability to 
provide military advice,” and he concluded that “the joint chiefs had been unable to formulate 
military strategy, preferring instead to do fiscally unconstrained, pie-in-the-sky strategic 
planning.”31 This made their advice useless when preparing a budget.32 More importantly, this 
highlighted the disconnect between military and civilian leaders and the budgetary and strategy-
making process. 
Reports like Locher’s ruffled many feathers across the defense community, mainly from 
those who preferred the status quo or were only interested in advancing their own agendas or 
service interests. The services predictably protested any reform fearing that it could come only at 
the expense of decades of hard-won influence. Throughout the halls of Congress, to the White 
House, and across the Potomac to the Pentagon, discussion and debate raged over the problems 
with the current civilian-military command structure. The whole process of military advisement 




reform bill began to take shape. Representative William Nichols and Senator Barry Goldwater 
organized and proposed the legislation to Congress. Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn 
eventually, after a long and grueling battle, got the reform bill unanimously approved in the 
Senate Armed Services Committee.
33
 The bill (designated H.R. 3622), was passed by the Senate 
and House respectively on September 16 and 17, 1986.
34
 
On October 1, 1986, a momentous, and yet uncelebrated, event took place that 
dramatically shaped the American defense establishment. Without fanfare or even a modest 
ceremony, President Ronald Reagan signed H.R. 3622. A political battle that raged for almost 
five years had ended; the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
was now law.
35
 Locher recalled that day, later writing that “as I reached my office and turned the 
handle to Room SR-232’s massive door, I was exhilarated by anticipation. I could not wait to 
watch the Goldwater-Nichols Act revitalize and transform the military and improve the odds for 
American service members put in harm’s way.”36 Locher’s excitement was well placed; 
Goldwater-Nichols delivered much-needed reforms to the defense establishment, military 
structure, and civil-military relations. Important to the issue at hand was the law’s intent to 
“increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning.”37 Goldwater-
Nichols reformed the strategy-making process at the highest levels by establishing an improved 
advisory process to the president and requiring the president to construct an actual national 
security strategy.  
 Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols explicitly outlined the president’s role in forming 
national strategy.
38
 According to Section 603, “the President shall transmit to Congress each year 
a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States. … The national 




submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year.”39 For the first time in American history, 
Congress required by law the president to outline the national strategy of the United States. 
Furthermore, by tying national security policy to the budget process, the president and Congress 
now had to account for resource capabilities when developing the nation's strategic plan. There 
now existed a process and guidelines for coherent and consistent strategic planning, and thus 
further advanced the steps taken by the National Security Act in creating a system of strategic 
development. Consequently, Goldwater-Nichols effectively established the president as the 
supreme strategist for national security and for promoting the national interests of the United 
States through the annual publication of a National Security Strategy. 
The new NSSs declare national interests through a written articulation of means and ends. 
The NSSs create a comprehensive plan to focus the national strategic direction, and they publicly 
announce that plan through “the unforgiving medium of cold type."40 Yet, it remains ironic that 
the public pays so little attention to it as the NSSs represent a president’s unified vision for the 
nation. While media outlets often report on a president's foreign policy, the unclassified National 
Security Strategies have traditionally received scant coverage.
41
 Former Senator and presidential 
candidate Gary Hart hypothesized the cause of this lack of interest in American grand strategy: 
Absent war, however, Americans have resisted ‘centralized planning’ as socialistic, 
intrusive, and repressive of initiative and enterprise. Thus, one of the great challenges of 
strategic thinking in the current age is to convince Americans—and particularly those 
distrustful of their own government—that to have a national strategy is to liberate the 
nation’s energies in purposeful ways rather than approach the world as representing ‘one 
damn thing after another’ and as requiring only ad hoc responses.42  
 
Providing direction for national interests is essential for accomplishing national 
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Strategy is a field where truth is sought in the pursuit of viable solutions. 
—Bernard Brodie, War and Politics 
 
 
The discussion of American national security strategy up to this point has provided some 
historical context, but it lacks a definition of the pivotal concept. Strategy, the core component of 
this thesis, is a complex idea described as both theory (what is strategy) and practice (often 
referred to as strategic planning).
1
 This chapter delves into both realms, constructing a theory of 
strategy through the evolution of its terminology and then applying that theory to a set of 
conditions or “tenets” for strategic planning. Modern strategic theory begins with Clausewitz and 
the “force as policy” tradition, and then grows beyond military strategy to grand strategy and its 
corollary, national strategy. Following the discussion of modern strategic thought, an analytical 
framework for qualifying strategic plans as proper planning is established in the “Tenets of 
Strategic Planning.” This list of qualifications is then compared to the requirements for creating a 
National Security Strategy outlined in Goldwater-Nichols. 
Modern discussion of strategic theory dates to the Napoleonic Wars. Prussian General 
Carl von Clausewitz witnessed the Napoleonic Wars and, afterwards, utilized his experience to 
compose a philosophy of war and strategy. Published as an uncompleted draft a year after his 
death in 1831, Clausewitz’s monumental treatise, On War, has influenced strategic thought ever 
since and is still required reading for military officers and students of national security affairs. 




of policy.”2  Clausewitz further defined strategy as “the use of the engagement [battle] for the 
purpose of the war,” adding that “[the strategist] will draft the plan of war, and the aim will 
determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.”3  While strategy is more complex than 
Clausewitz would like it to appear, his definition provides a foundation for discussion of national 
strategy. 
Many modern scholars have incorporated Clausewitz’s concepts of the relation of 
military force to policy when crafting their explanations of strategy.
4
  Historian Colin Gray 
closely follows the Clausewitzian model when he explains strategy as “the bridge that relates 
military power to political purpose; … the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the 
ends of policy.”5  Historian Hew Strachan describes the process of strategy in a similar manner 
concluding that “the reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a 
dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a 
compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to implement it.”6  
Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a historian and veteran of World War I, also follows this methodology 
defining strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of 
policy.”7 Although this list of scholars who follow the Clausewitzian model is by no means 
comprehensive, Gray, Strachan, and Liddell Hart are three prominent examples of the “force as 
policy” tradition. 
However, Liddell Hart takes his discussion of strategic theory further by establishing a 
clear distinction between strategy and grand strategy. He states, “The term ‘grand strategy’ 
serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in execution.’ For the role of grand strategy—higher 
strategy—is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards 




contrast to the Clausewitzian model, Liddell Hart explains that “fighting power is but one of the 
instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial 
pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure to 
weaken the opponent’s will.”9  Liddell Hart’s description broadens the concept of strategy 
beyond the narrow focus on military power in Clausewitz’s definition.10  
Concisely defined then, grand strategy is a framework for applying a nation’s power and 
resources to achieve large political purposes.
11
 Though grand strategy accurately reflects the 
overall concepts described here (especially in going beyond a narrow military focus), when 
discussing the American NSS as a continuous strategic plan with periodic updates, a more 
accurate construct may be established. A former Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs 
for Vice President Richard Cheney and current Professor of International Affairs at Princeton, 
Aaron L. Friedberg, describes this progression of terminology: 
It has become fashionable to speak of a need for an American “grand strategy.” This 
concept is an expansion of the traditional notion of military strategy and it is meant to 
take account not only of fighting power, but of the full range of financial, commercial, 
and diplomatic pressures that one society can use to break the will of another. As broad 
as it is, “grand strategy” properly refers only to periods of open warfare. A new term—
perhaps “national strategy”—is needed to cover prolonged intervals of intense but less 
than all-out international competition. Such a strategy might aim not only at preparing for 
victory in the military sense, but also at a range of lesser, peacetime objectives from 
improving the nation’s military, political, and economic standing relative to its 
competitors (or simply preventing an erosion in that position) to weakening the position 
of an opponent. National strategy encompasses both planning for the use of the various 
implements of state power and attention to the domestic policies needed to produce and 




As Friedberg concluded, grand strategy, though expansive in its reach, still does not go far 
enough. Grand strategy connotes a time of war, which is not always the case. However, the term 




application. Historian Samuel P. Huntington further refined the definition of national strategy, 
noting, “The first question, of course, is what is national strategy?” Huntington answered: “let 
me first indicate what strategy is not—foreign policy. Foreign policy includes the goals that a 
government pursues and the means it employs in its external environment, whatever the nature of 
that environment. What is different about strategy in a meaningful sense is that it is conducted 
against an opponent.”13 Huntington’s musings on national strategy implies that there must be an 
opponent for a strategy to exist. Without an opponent, an antagonist, there would be nothing to 
stop a nation from pursuing its goals. Hence, there would be no need for a strategic plan. Thus, 
while national strategy focuses on the goals throughout times of war and peace, it is also directed 
at circumventing impediments to achieving national objectives. 
Furthermore, a national strategy is vitally important because it provides direction along 
with a set of goals. International relations experts Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin 
P. Sheehan summarized the historical importance of establishing a national strategy: 
National strategy is important because history teaches that a state will be more capable of 
accomplishing its national objectives if those objectives are balanced against external 
threats and the type and quantity of available national resources. This conclusion appears 
to be valid over time and across cultures. States that failed to reconcile means and ends 
adequately ultimately had difficulty accomplishing their national objectives. Conversely, 
states that consciously attempted to match means and ends were generally more 




For a nation to be successful in protecting its interests and achieving its objectives, a strategy is 
needed to guide that effort. Without it, a nation is unable to utilize its resources effectively and 
efficiently to accomplish their objectives. Thus, national strategy is a framework for applying all 
of the national resources available to achieve large political purposes coherently directed against 




Therefore, after this more or less abstract discussion of strategy, the question remains 
how is strategic theory put into practice. National security studies expert Bernard Brodie 
straddled the divide between theory and practice in his discussion of strategy: “strategic thinking, 
or ‘theory’ if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a ‘how to do it’ study, a guide 
to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently.”15 Brodie aptly illustrated the point that 
strategic theory is sensible in nature; the discussion inherently contains practical applications. 
One cannot discuss strategy without wandering into the realm of strategic application. Brodie 
asserted this notion that theory is linked to application: “above all, strategic theory is a theory for 
action.”16 Essentially, then, strategy is a plan of how to achieve objectives. 
After developing a fundamental theory for strategy and reaching a more exact definition 
of the application of theory as a strategic plan, specifically referred to as national strategy, the 
discussion may now turn to essential pillars required for any strategic plan. In order for a plan to 
be considered a proper strategic plan, it must fulfill basic requirements. These requirements are 
set forth as the “Tenets of Strategic Planning.”17 
First, it should be noted that the strategic plans as discussed here are documented national 
strategies. Utilizing the previously established definition of national strategy, a strategic plan 
must incorporate means of action and resources beyond simply the use of military force. These 
considerations may be economic, diplomatic, political, or anything else that strategists have at 
their disposal that may aid them in obtaining their objectives. Thus, the first tenet dictates that a 
strategic plan must look beyond military force to the utilization of all available resources. 
The second tenet notes that the ends and means must be plausible. The plan must reflect 
achievable goals, as well as demonstrate possible methods to accomplish those goals. This basic, 




available resources. If objectives are unattainable or fall outside of feasible parameters, then the 
plan is flawed and will most likely fail. Though this strategic consideration appears obvious, it 
remains an essential component for a successful strategy. 
 Additionally, a strategic plan must explicitly state both the objectives and the methods for 
obtaining them. Enumerated objectives require clarity and specificity. From this point, the next 
logical step would be to develop a means, methodology, plan, etc., for obtaining those 
objectives: for, as Clausewitz argued, the objectives would dictate necessary actions.
18
 Clearly 
defined goals coupled with a clear plan of action are crucial for true strategic planning. This 
consideration represents the third Tenet of Strategic Planning.  
 The fourth tenet demands that the strategist realizes that objectives must be both short-
term and long-term. Planning should account for the longer timeline of events, and it should 
exhibit a longevity that extends beyond crisis-management or the conflict itself. A proper 
strategy will plan for the future regardless of whether or not the conflict is still occurring; it will 
plan for the peace after the war and the enemy’s reaction to the fallout. Paul Kennedy, historian 
and Director of International Security Studies at Yale, illustrated the importance of focused 
strategic planning: “The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of 
the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the 
preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best 
interests.”19 Thus, the ultimate goal of strategy is the vested long-term interests of the nation and 
the immediate and future objectives necessary to attain these national interests. 
Military historian Dennis Showalter expands the purview of strategy even further while 
incorporating another important tenet. Showalter describes strategy as “the calculation among 




and ends may entail. In this manner, Showalter avoids restricting strategy to uses of force and 
political objectives. Yet, the most important contribution from his definition is “will.” 
Showalter, as did Clausewitz, rightly highlights the principle of will, which is also 
commonly referred to as “the will of the people” or “public opinion.” The will of the people is 
necessary to the success of any strategic plan. Without broad national support, a plan is doomed 
to fail. In the case of the United States, the will of the people is important because public opinion 
determines leadership, which in turn dictates strategic direction. Public opinion is essential to 
any leader (military or civilian) of a democracy. Modern leaders of democracies answer directly 
to the people. History has demonstrated that when rulers fail to keep the people’s trust, the 
people will often revolt against their leader. Despots, while not having to answer to public 
opinion as consistently and directly as democratically elected leaders, still must be wary of 
public opinion and consider it when devising their strategic plans.  
Public opinion is a double-edged sword. A leader must account not only for the will of 
the people to employ the means as dictated by his strategic plan, but he must also consider how 
they will react to outside factors. The twentieth century, as described by historian Beatrice 
Heuser in The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to Present, witnessed the rise 
of strategically targeting an enemy’s populace during war with the overt intention of destroying 
its will to continue fighting. Nations utilized terror to demonstrate to the people the horrific 
human suffering of war in order to compel a quick resolution to the conflict.
21
 Targeting public 
opinion developed into a “strategy of terror.” This has been utilized by strategists to justify the 
establishment of air power strategies such as strategic bombing campaigns, with the goal of 
targeting cities.
22
 Heuser further contends that the later nuclear targeting of civilians was a 




Of course, targeting public opinion is not a novel strategy created by modern strategists. 
Clausewitz addressed this Tenet of Strategic Planning in On War: 
The fighting forces must be destroyed. … The country must be occupied. … Yet both of 
these things may be done and the war … cannot be considered to have ended so long as 
the enemy’s will has not been broken: in other words, so long as the enemy government 




Clausewitz understood that the will is one of the fundamental considerations in war and strategy. 
He recognized that a conflict will continue for as long as public opinion supports the effort. Yet, 
if the will of the people was broken, the nation would be deterred from continuing the conflict. 
Targeting public will, however, is not unique to war. Modern strategists have realized its 
potential beyond the battlefield. Such consideration for public opinion also appeared in NSC-68. 
The authors of NSC-68 understood that public opinion was crucial to implementing any strategy, 
noting that perceptions of the balance of power held by foreign and domestic mass opinion were 
just as important to American security as the actual balance in their situation.
25
 This account for 
public opinion transcends open conflict also to include from Aaron L. Friedberg’s definition of 
national strategy periods of “prolonged intervals of intense but less than all-out international 
competition.”26 Thus, the will of the people is a vital consideration in any strategic plan and it, 
therefore, comprises the fifth Tenet of Strategic Planning. 
Another crucial consideration for strategic planning is that plans are not executed in a 
vacuum. Outside actors also affect plans in action. The sixth Tenet of Strategic Planning 
acknowledges that other actors, such as an enemy or ally, continue to act and react to the 
evolving circumstances as they unfold. Many strategic plans fail to consider actions of external 
actors. In strategic planning, strategists must understand that other actors – directly targeted by 




“however absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes 
necessary to take the enemy into account.”27 The same can be said in times of peace. Colin S. 
Gray also commented on this crucial observation in strategic planning, stating that “in the face of 
ignorance about the enemy and his plans, more often than not governments simply assume that 
he will cooperate and play his pre-designated role as victim-villain. Even when an enemy’s plans 
are known in advance with high confidence, it is not unusual for political leaders and generals to 
anticipate benign consequences from that hostile behavior.”28 Though often overlooked, a proper 
strategic plan must incorporate an understanding of the fact that other actors will undoubtedly 
make decisions and take actions that affect the pre-designed strategy. A true strategy accounts 
for this by estimating and anticipating how another actor may react to action (or possibly 
inaction) taken. After all, one of the fundamental assumptions of strategy is that it takes place 
against an opponent.  
When considering outside actors, it comes as no surprise that a certain degree of 
uncertainty is inherent to strategic planning. Understanding that the unknown will always occur 
and that no plan is perfect, the final Tenet of Strategic Planning states that strategic plans should 
be flexible and adaptable over time. While specific considerations should be accounted for, 
strategies need to reflect the fact that strategists lack the ability to foresee future events. One of 
American strategic theorist J. C. Wylie’s basic assumptions for war planning is that “we cannot 
predict with certainty the pattern of the war for which we prepare ourselves.”29 Therefore, a 
strategic plan needs to be flexible enough to adapt to the unknown as it arises. Clausewitz 
originally summarized this tenet: 
In war, as we have already pointed out, all action is aimed at probable rather than at 
certain success. The degree of certainty that is lacking must in every case be left to fate, 




should be as slight as possible, but only in reference to a particular case—in other words, 
it should be as small as possible in that individual case. But we should not habitually 
prefer the course that involves the least uncertainty. That would be an enormous mistake, 





 Strategic plans should be able to withstand a certain degree of uncertainty, or as Clausewitz 
called it, friction. Events will occur that can derail the best of plans; however, the best plans 
incorporate a degree of flexibility to account for these events. A strategist should minimize the 
possibility of uncertainty while not restricting oneself to a predictably un-daring plan.  
 Clausewitz addressed the unknown at length while discussing strategy as it relates to war. 
He subdivides the unknown in war into two subcategories: uncertainty and chance. Uncertainty 
describes decisions that have to be made with only seeing a small portion of the entirety of 
events. This is often referred to as the “fog of war.” Clausewitz asserts that “War is the realm of 
uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of 
greater or lesser uncertainty.”31 This aspect of war planning connects with national strategic 
planning in that plans are created without all of the facts.  
The unknown in strategy is also a derivative of chance. Chance is the intercession of 
random events that could affect the outcome of a strategic decision. This idea remains distinct 
from uncertainty in that chance is random, such as events that derail a plan in motion as opposed 
to not seeing the entire scope of things as they are. For instance, the weather could dramatically 
change, thus altering the course of events.
32
 Clausewitz offered: “War is the realm of chance. No 
other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with 
this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of 




occur that derail even the most well-thought-out plans. For example, NSC-68, for all of its 
foresight, makes no mention of the approaching Korean conflict.  
 Clausewitz’s discussion of uncertainty eventually culminated in his notion of “friction,” a 
term that he borrowed from the scientific community. Clausewitz defined friction as “the force 
that makes the apparently easy so difficult.”34 Friction is the accumulation of imperfections that 
separates an ideal plan from real world results. For instance, a plan may dictate that it should 
take two days to transfer soldiers from Point A to Point B and under ideal circumstances it would 
take two days. However, real-world imperfections such as logistical bottlenecks, trucks breaking 
down, poor road conditions, etc. make the transport take longer than the two days originally 
expected. Clausewitz clarified friction as “countless minor incidents—the kind you can never 
really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far 
short of the intended goal. … Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the 
factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.”35 Friction, the combination of chance and 
the fog of war, represents the unknown elements that can set any strategic plan off course. The 
better strategic plan considers such eventualities. 
 These Tenets of Strategic Planning represent a rubric for evaluating a strategic plan; a 
rudimentary set of guidelines for establishing what a proper strategic plan should entail. As such, 
this analytical framework may be applied to the National Security Strategies of the United States, 
as these are strategic plans intended to provide vision and direction for securing national 
interests. As previously described in Chapter 1, Goldwater-Nichols requires the president to 
submit annually a strategic plan to Congress in conjunction with the annual budget. Furthermore, 
Section 603 of the Act provides a list of requirements regarding the composition of that strategic 
plan.
36




 The first requirement reflects one of the core parts of strategic planning. Goldwater-
Nichols states that a “comprehensive description and discussion of… the worldwide interests, 
goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United 
States” is required in the National Security Strategy.37 Essentially, the president must identify 
and provide written articulation of American national strategic objectives. Goldwater-Nichols 
does not bind national objectives to objectives during times of war, but implicitly directs 
strategic planning to continue in times of peace. 
 In an effort to separate the narrow military means of strategy from the larger vision 
necessary for national strategy, Section 603 continues to divide strategic planning into the 
National Security Strategy and its corresponding National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS is 
a national strategy that is meant to be all-encompassing in its reach. However, the NMS 
exclusively focuses on the preparation and application of military force to achieve national 
objectives. The NMS takes direction from the NSS; the NMS supports the NSS by constructing a 
strategic plan for the use of military force within the parameters established in the NSS. 
 Section 603 further illustrates the separation of military force as the exclusive function of 
strategy in the second and third requirements that state that each national security strategy should 
include “the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the 
United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the 
United States” and “the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, 
military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the 
interests and achieve the goals and objectives.”38 This broadens the president’s strategy toolkit to 




requirements clearly link means and ends, acknowledging that they are both short-term and long-
term in scope while not necessarily being of a military nature. 
 The fourth delineated condition of a National Security Strategy illustrates that a president 
needs to consider the means in the strategic plan he recommends to Congress. The Act states that 
the president must consider and discuss “the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to 
carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the 
balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to 
support the implementation of the national security strategy.”39 This component directly 
correlates to the previously discussed aspects of means in developing strategy found in the 
Tenets of Strategic Planning. A strategic plan requires means that match up with ends, contain a 
level of feasibility, and acknowledge the resources available. The means must be balanced, 
carefully crafted, and comprehensively articulated in the strategic plan. 
 The final requirement denotes the unknown in strategic planning, stating that the 
president should include “such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress 
on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.”40 This unbound 
statement acknowledges that Congress could not see all eventualities or include a complete 
discussion of the essential components of a strategic plan. Therefore, they left open the 
possibilities for additional components that the president may include in the strategic plan in 
order to secure American objectives. 
 In order for presidential strategy to qualify as a strategic plan, specifically designated as 
National Security Strategy, the plan must meet the basic conditions set forth by Section 603 of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Furthermore, to be a 




Strategic Planning. Chapters 3 through 6 will apply these analytical rubrics to the National 
Security Strategies of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. 
Bush. 
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“TIT FOR TAT” CONTAINMENT 
 
The years ahead are great ones for this country, for the cause of freedom and the spread 
of civilization. The West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism. It 
won't bother to dismiss or denounce it, it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human 
history whose last pages are even now being written. 
—Ronald Reagan, “Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of 
Notre Dame”, May 17, 1981 
 
 Throughout his presidency, Ronald Reagan took a unique approach to the Cold War 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reagan infused his brand of 
containment into his national strategy. Reagan also faced the challenge of being the first 
president to develop an NSS following the passage of Goldwater-Nichols. His 1987 National 
Security Strategy largely met this challenge, fulfilling the requirements established by 
Goldwater-Nichols and the even more stringent qualifications of the Tenets of Strategic 
Planning. Reagan’s subsequent 1988 National Security Strategy also qualifies as a proper 
strategic plan, as it updated and adapted the 1987 NSS to the changes in foreign relations and 
national security of the United States. 
 The policies of Reagan’s two-term presidency revolved around the central question of 
previous administrations dating back to Harry Truman – how to approach the Cold War. Reagan 
adopted a policy of aggressive containment, departing from President Jimmy Carter’s policies, 
and even discarding Nixon and Kissinger’s détente.1 Reagan’s February 26, 1986 “Address to 
the Nation on National Security” outlined how he perceived the Soviet threat: 
Between 1970 and 1985 alone, the Soviets invested $500 billion more than the United 
States in defense and built nearly three times as many strategic missiles. As a 




between our two countries. … But it's not just the immense Soviet arsenal that puts us on 
our guard. The record of Soviet behavior, the long history of Soviet brutality toward 
those who are weaker, reminds us that the only guarantee of peace and freedom is our 





Reagan brought the Cold War to the forefront with one of his prominent campaign promises to 
meet this threat by rearming America against a perceived Soviet military advantage. From 1981 
to 1988, President Reagan appropriated over $2 trillion to the Department of Defense to meet his 
goal of surpassing Soviet military capabilities.
3
  
Reagan found justification in his buildup through the phrase “peace through strength.”4 
For Reagan, deterrence was the best method for approaching the Soviets.
5
 In his “Address to the 
Nation on Defense and National Security” on March 23, 1983, Reagan described his vision for 
approaching the Cold War: “‘Deterrence’ means simply this: making sure any adversary who 
thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the 
risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. We 
maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only invites aggression.”6 
Giving remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in 
Orlando, Florida on March 8, 1983, Reagan described the Cold War conflict in ideological terms. 
He asserted that “the real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will 
and faith.”7 The struggle facing the United States now transcended simple dollars-and-cents 
debates surrounding military appropriations and elevated it to a higher level of a moral battle. 
Reagan clearly portrayed this as a “good versus evil” situation even identifying the Soviet Union 
as an “evil empire.”8 While some of this rhetoric may have been pandering to a conservative 




 Foreign affairs commentator Fareed Zakaria contends that Reagan’s version of 
containment followed a “tit for tat” pattern. It first sought to correct the imbalance against Soviet 
expansionist policies during the 1970s. The Soviet Union directly threatened the United States 
with its military buildup and through its support of the communist movements throughout the 
western hemisphere. Reagan sought to contain the spread of communism that had unintentionally 
been encouraged by lax policies of previous administrations.
9
 Zakaria describes the Reagan 
Administration approach utilizing the “tit for tat” pattern: 
 
The Reagan strategy of containment followed strikingly similar lines. In response to what 
it saw as American cooperation during detente, Soviet expansionism in Southeast Asia, 
Africa, and Afghanistan was viewed as rank defection. The Reagan strategy was to 
retaliate against this defection with the utmost clarity. When by 1986 the Soviet Union 





Reagan sought to counter the Soviet threat through “tit for tat” containment. It began with a 
military buildup to match that of the Soviet Union, and then shifted focus to peripheral 
communist movements. However, this harsh stance towards the Soviet Union began to soften 
following the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as the new Soviet leader in 1985. Gorbachev, 
confronting poor economic conditions in the Soviet Union, sought to reduce tensions with the 
United States. This resulted in a series of summits between Reagan and Gorbachev beginning 
with the 1985 summit in Geneva, Switzerland and followed by the 1986 summit in Reykjavík, 
Iceland aimed at strategic arms reductions. Gorbachev’s rapprochement and gradual warming to 
the United States led to a reciprocal response from Reagan. Going into the 1987 and 1988 





 Ronald Reagan published his administration’s first National Security Strategy in January 
1987, just a few months after he signed Goldwater-Nichols into law. The 1987 NSS laid out the 
basic construct for how future National Security Strategies were to be written. The document 
begins with an enumeration of five specific national interests that guide the administration’s 
strategy: 
 
1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental 
values and institutions intact. 
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy. 
3. The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout 
the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system. 
4. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests. 
5. The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships.11 
 
The 1987 NSS further elaborates on each of the five stated national interests. The NSS 
expands on each interest, broadening the description of it and then following it with a list of 
specific objectives necessary to facilitate and protect the national interests. For instance, in 
describing the first point of maintaining the national security of the United States, this section 
explains that “the United States, in cooperation with its allies, must seek to deter any aggression 
that could threaten that security, and, should deterrence fail, must be prepared to repel or defeat 
any military attack and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and 
its allies.”12 The NSS follows with nine specific objectives that include: preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons; deterring hostile attacks against the United States, resorting to the use of force 
if necessary; and forcing “the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of its domestic economic 
shortcomings in order to discourage excessive Soviet military expenditures and global 
adventurism.”13 While only a small portion of the objectives and interests specifically mention 




Union as its central focus. It becomes very apparent that dealing with the Soviet Union is 
Reagan’s central objective, though this is not explicitly stated. 
 President Reagan connects means to the aforementioned ends through a lengthy 
description of military aspects of national power. In the section “U.S. Defense Policy,” which 
comprises just over half of the entire document, Reagan at length describes how military means 
will be utilized to achieve his prescribed ends. Portions of this chapter define means for 
implementing military power in broad generalities and concepts. For example, after spending 
some time detailing the importance of intelligence support for national security, the section 
concludes by noting that “as part of our intelligence strategy we have taken a number of steps in 
recent years to strengthen our security and counterintelligence capabilities. These efforts will 
continue as a matter of high national priority.”14 This section, while descriptive in the importance 
of maintaining intelligence capabilities, unfortunately does not offer any substantial input as to 
how intelligence will be utilized or improved in order to achieve national objectives. However, 
not all of the chapter on military means lacks clarity and direction. 
 Some portions of the chapter “U.S. Defense Policy” offer explicit methodologies. For 
example, when discussing the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program the 1987 NSS notes some 
of the elements of the program that are being pursued:  
Improved strategic command, control and communications, to ensure timely warning of 
attack and an assured means of passing retaliatory orders to our strategic forces; ICBM 
modernization centered on the PEACEKEEPER (MX) and Small ICBM, both of which 
will have enhanced survivability through mobility; SLBM modernization, including 
deployment of the TRIDENT submarine and development and deployment of the 
TRIDENT II missile; Bomber and cruise missile upgrades, including deployment of the 
B-1B, and the exploitation of the important U.S. lead in low-observable technology by 
development of the Advanced Technology Bomber and the Advanced Cruise Missile; 
Strategic Defense programs, including SDI and the Air Defense Initiative, to redress the 
long-standing neglect of defensive programs generally, and to capitalize on the potential 









This example demonstrates an extreme of how prescriptive the means can be. Overall the chapter 
tends to blend the two methods of general concepts and explicit description in defining military 
means. Through this technique, the 1987 NSS generates a concise view of how the Reagan 
Administration approaches the application of military force as a component of national strategy 
while also including enough detail as to provide compelling examples to support the 
administration’s broad conceptualizations. 
 While the majority of the 1987 National Security Strategy is primarily focused on 
military applications of national power, the document also dedicates sections to other aspects of 
national power. The section “International Economic Policy” describes how the administration 
utilizes economic measures such as blocking Soviet membership from the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Denying the Soviet Union membership to these international organizations would enable the 
United States and the West to apply economic leverage on the Soviet Union. The economic 
policy section details additional opportunities for economic power beyond this example, but it 
lacks anywhere near the development of the chapter on military power. This oversight may be 
the consequence of President Reagan’s emphasis on military means as well as a short timeline in 
constructing the document. However, this still demonstrates an effective incorporation, even at a 
minimal level, of economic aspects of national power. 
 The 1987 NSS also lacks emphasis on applications of diplomatic power. The document 
contains a short section titled “Political and Informational Elements of National Power” where 




agencies such as the Department of State, Department of Defense, Agency for International 
Development, and the U.S Information Agency among others for taking the lead in U.S. foreign 
relations. According to the NSS, these agencies should disseminate effective political and 
informational policy. However, only a general, non-descript conception of how to achieve this is 
provided: 
Our political and informational strategy must also reach to the peoples of denied areas, 
particularly the USSR and Eastern Europe—to encourage hope for change and to educate 
publics on the benefits of free institutions. This is achieved through the electronic media, 
written materials, and the increased contact and exchange of ideas that come from such 
contact. The process of gradual change will take place inside, but the stimulant and the 
vision of “how things could be” must come from outside in a closed society.17 
 
This evidently lacks any sort of clarity of action. It provides a general direction, but no road map 
for success. Again, this may in part be due to the Reagan Administration’s focus on military 
aspects of confronting the Soviet Union. 
 Through the discussion of ends and means, the 1987 NSS largely fulfills the requirements 
of Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. The document clearly states American interests and 
objectives. Furthermore, it discusses various aspects of national power, though, admittedly, some 
better than others. Both short-term and long-term uses of national power are also discussed. For 
example, the 1987 NSS notes that regarding nuclear testing the Reagan Administration sought 
“essential [Soviet] verification improvements to permit ratification of existing treaties: the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.”18 Alternatively, at a 
meeting in Iceland with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan proposed to 
accept a ten-year commitment to honor the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would 
effectively extend it to 1996.
19




successfully fulfills two of the requirements of Section 603 of declaring American interests and 
incorporating short-term and long-term uses of national power.  
 The 1987 NSS also contains an overview of the foreign relations of the United States. In 
the chapter “U.S. Foreign Policy,” the state of American commitments and interests are detailed 
in regional sections (Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, East Asia and Pacific, The Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, The Middle East and South Asia, and Africa). For example, in 
discussing East Asia and the Pacific, the document declares that “the goal [of the United States] 
is to strengthen our natural political and economic associations, while proceeding steadily with 
necessary modernization of our military forces deployed in the area.”20 This will be achieved by 
establishing a stronger relationship with Japan through such measures as the U.S.-Japan Mutual 
Security Treaty. The section also discusses the importance of relations with Thailand and 
Australia for pursuing regional interests. This example demonstrates fulfillment of Section 603’s 
requirement dictating that the NSS describe the worldwide commitments of the United States. 
 The final requirement of Section 603 stipulates that the NSS contains an evaluation of 
American capabilities to carry out the strategic plan proposed by the president. The 1987 NSS 
fulfills this in the chapter “Executing the Strategy.” The NSS notes that President Reagan 
requested $16.2 billion for the foreign assistance programs that function to help secure American 
interests abroad. Reagan argued that Congress’s slashing of this request to $13.6 billion would 
weaken the capabilities of the United States to achieve its objectives and ran the risk of having to 
“defend our interests with more direct, costly, and painful means.”21 Following this evaluation of 
budgetary discrepancies, this chapter continues to devote much of its ink towards appraising the 
defense capabilities of the United States. For example, the document states that “the warfighting 




of ships and aircraft. This long-term program to assure our ability to use the world’s oceans in 
peace and war requires continuing support.”22 By evaluating American capabilities in instances 
such as these, the 1987 NSS fulfills the final requirement set forth by Section 603 of Goldwater-
Nichols. 
 Through completing the requirements of Section 603, the 1987 NSS also meets the first 
four Tenets of Strategic Planning. The 1987 NSS looks beyond military force to incorporate 
various resources and dimensions of national power into the national strategy. It also explicitly 
defines means and correlating ends; these include both short-term and long-term objectives. 
Furthermore, the NSS contains an appraisal of U.S. capabilities for carrying out the strategic 
plan. By accomplishing this, the 1987 NSS completes the first four tenets. 
 The fifth tenet, accounting for public opinion, is clearly stated as the last paragraph of the 
document. Throughout the NSS Reagan solicits Congressional support, but only at the end does 
he directly appeal to the will of the people. The document states that “I ask that we stand 
together in my final two years as your President to ensure that we continue setting in place a 
strategy which will carry us securely into the 21
st
 Century.”23 Here Reagan acknowledges that he 
must answer to the people. Though this appeal to public opinion may stem from Reagan’s 
interest in preserving his legacy, it still demonstrates that he understands that in creating a 
national strategy, the will of the people must be taken into account. 
  The sixth tenet notes that strategic planning does not occur in a vacuum, but that the 
strategist must also take into account the actions of outside actors. The 1987 NSS demonstrates 
this throughout the document, usually through an estimate as to the actions of the Soviet Union. 
The NSS provides an excellent example when discussing competitive strategies, declaring that 




force the Soviets to divert resources in ways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may not 
necessarily threaten our own forces. Low observable (stealth) technology, for example, can 
render much of the Soviet investment in air defense obsolete and requires the Soviets to divert 
resources from offensive forces to defensive forces.”24 Here Reagan notes how the United States 
can apply pressure in order to compel a reaction from the Soviet Union, thus considering Soviet 
action. While taking Soviet actions into account is clearly the top priority, the 1987 NSS also 
considers the actions of other actors such as NATO, terrorists, third world countries, and 
potential allies. The NSS undoubtedly incorporates the sixth Tenet of Strategic Planning. 
 The final tenet observes that since friction and uncertainty will always exist, a strategic 
plan must be flexible and adaptable over time in order to account for the unknown. This tenet is 
realized, not directly through the 1987 NSS itself, but by a comparison with the 1988 NSS. The 
1988 NSS is remarkably similar to the 1987 NSS; the only differences between them being 
organizational and minor elaborations and updates to certain sections. For instance, the section 
on arms reductions was updated to include the treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) signed on December 8, 1987 between Reagan and Gorbachev.
25
 This new consideration 
slightly alters the arms controls section from the 1987 NSS where it placed as one the nation’s 
priorities reaching a consensus with the Soviet Union on eliminating land-based long-range INF 
missiles and agreements on limiting INF arsenals.
26
 Another example of an NSS update appears 
in the economic policy section. In the 1988 NSS Reagan adds a paragraph detailing the 
importance of energy security. The 1988 NSS notes that disruption in foreign oil supplies 
presents a major threat to American national security. Reagan planned to help manage this 






 An additional point of deviation between the two documents is in how they incorporate 
the fifth tenet of accounting for the will of the people. The 1987 NSS made a clear bid for their 
approval, demonstrating a consideration for public sentiment. The 1988 NSS approaches this a 
bit differently: 
Above all, we must both [the president and Congress] work harder to rebuild a bipartisan 
public consensus on our National Security Strategy. … Renewed consensus will be 
forged on the anvil of public debate – among responsible officials in government, 
between the Congress and the Executive, in consultations with our allies and friends, and 
among the larger community of interested and concerned American citizens. … There 
can be no endeavor more important for the long-term well-being of the American 
people…28 
 
The 1988 NSS indirectly appeals to the people. It calls for public scrutiny and debate over the 
formation and direction of national strategy for the United States. Though the petition for public 
approval does not go directly to the people, it is clear that President Reagan considers the will of 
the people to be an important measure for creating and implementing national strategy. The 
above statement demonstrates that Reagan believes that ultimate authority lies with the people 
who elected him. 
Aside from minor instances such as this, the core ends and means of the 1987 NSS are 
directly transferred to the 1988 NSS. The overall change occurs at the organizational level, 
taking a regional approach to national strategy. Considering this with the aforementioned update 
to the fifth tenet, the 1988 NSS, working in conjunction with 1987 NSS, fulfills the requirements 
of Goldwater-Nichols and the Tenets of Strategic Planning. Therefore, both the 1987 and 1988 
National Security Strategies published by the Reagan Administration qualify as proper strategic 
plans. 
The 1988 NSS displayed a more refined document from the 1987 NSS. Given the 




administration more so than the previous. However, throughout the changes in structure and 
adaptations, both National Security Strategies demonstrated a clear vision of Reagan’s version of 
containment. Both put military priorities and confrontation with the Soviet Union central to 
national strategy. The two National Security Strategies show the shift in Reagan Administration 
policies towards a strategy of arms reductions as opposed to an outright military buildup. Reagan 
sought to meet the Soviet threat through a decrease in arms while maintaining technological 
superiority. Defense programs such as SDI and financial pressures from the arms race Reagan 
initiated at the beginning of his administration helped to convince the Soviet Union to cooperate 
on arms reductions. After meeting the Soviet military buildup, Reagan met Gorbachev at the 
negotiating table, thus depicting the aptly phrased “tit for tat” containment that defined his 
administration’s approach to foreign policy. 
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A NEW WORLD ORDER 
 
A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand 
wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be 
born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law 
supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared 
responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the 
weak. 
—George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian 
Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit,” September 11, 1990 
 
 
President George H. W. Bush was the first president to enter office after the passage of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. President Bush, though 
required to submit an annual national security strategy report to Congress at the beginning of 
each year, only managed to submit three National Security Strategies. The 1990 and 1991 
National Security Strategies successfully fulfill the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
aptly representing the intended spirit of Section 603. Furthermore, these two National Security 
Strategies also adhere to the Tenets of Strategic Planning, thus making them proper strategic 
plans. Yet, where these two NSS’s succeed, the 1993 NSS most surely fails. The 1993 NSS, 
published the same month Bush left office, does not fulfill the conditions set forth by Section 
603, nor does it adhere to the Tenets of Strategic Planning. President Bush left office with a 
strategy report that amounted to a farewell address devoid of any strategic substance and 
undeserving of the title of “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 
 While his Presidency ended on a strategic sour note, the 1990 and 1991 NSSs found 




image for U.S. national strategy; a Post-Cold War multi-polar world led by the United States.  
President Bush entitled his vision a “new world order.” He hoped to create this new world order 
by “prohibit[ing] state-to-state aggression through multilateral cooperation in international and 
regional organizations.”1 The new world order grew out of the rapidly changing international 
environment in which the Bush Administration found itself. 
 President Bush did not commence his term with the guiding principle of a new world 
order. The rapid decline of the Soviet Union forced Bush and his advisors to reconsider the roles 
of both the United States and the Soviet Union in a fluid post-Cold War environment. 
Furthermore, this realignment of international politics occurred in the context of the 
machinations of a Middle Eastern dictator named Saddam Hussein. Bush, acknowledging the 
precarious relations between the United States and the crumbling Soviet Union, consulted Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev concerning the swift changes. President Bush recounted a September 
7, 1990 meeting with Gorbachev where he said, “I think there is an opportunity to develop out of 
this tragedy [Iraq invasion of Kuwait] a new world order. … The closer we can be together 
today, the closer the new world order. … I want to work with you as equal partners in dealing 
with this. I want to go to the American people tomorrow night to close the book on the Cold War 
and offer them the vision of this new world order in which we will cooperate.”2 This marked the 
beginning of Bush’s vision for the future, one where a multi-polar world worked in concert to 
resolve differences; a world where decisions could be made outside the trappings of the Cold 
War. 
Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s national security advisor, recalls how the Bush 
Administration and National Security Council tried to set a pattern of international relations for 




groundwork for the new world order was set. Scowcroft reminisced that “our foundation was the 
premise that the United States henceforth would be obligated to lead the world community to an 
unprecedented degree, as demonstrated by the Iraqi crisis, and that we should attempt to pursue 
our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the 
international community.”3 While Scowcroft succinctly presented the vision of the Bush 
Administration going forward, he also noted that this vision developed over time; it was not 
established policy from the beginning. 
The drastically changing international environment that President Bush faced during his 
time in office helped to create his image of the United States’ future place in the world. Yet, this 
chimerical environment did not prove itself conducive to publishing National Security Strategies. 
Coming into office in January of 1989, President Bush was required to publish a National 
Security Strategy within next five months. Don M. Snider, who helped author the National 
Security Strategies for President Bush, noted that publication of the 1989 NSS was delayed until 
1990 due to the swiftly progressing situation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
4
 In 
1989, pro-democracy demonstrations spread across the Eastern European Soviet bloc. Gorbachev 
made it clear that the Soviet Union would no longer intervene. This resulted in the fall of the 
Berlin Wall followed by, in early 1990, steps towards Germany’s reunification. Rapidly 
changing events in Europe forced a redraft of several major components of the strategy.  
 With the changing world scene, the Bush Administration published its first NSS in March 
of 1990. In the preface of the 1990 NSS, President Bush stated that, “this Report outlines the 
direction we will take to protect the legacy of the postwar era while enabling the United States to 
help shape a new era, one that moves beyond containment and that will take us into the next 




world order was already taking shape. However, did the 1990 NSS successfully articulate this 
vision while adhering to the requirements set forth by the Goldwater-Nichols Act? 
The first requirement in Section 603 stipulates that the president must declare and 
describe objectives pertaining to the national security of the United States. After a brief 
introduction describing the historical objectives of the United States, the 1990 NSS broadly 
defines four core political objectives of the United States: 
The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental 
values intact and its institutions and people secure. … A healthy and growing U.S. 
economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national 
endeavors at home and abroad. … A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, 
human rights, and democratic institutions. … Healthy, cooperative and politically 




Using these broad interests as a foundation, the report establishes nineteen specific objectives. 
The detailed goals commence with a traditional military focus. For example, the NSS discusses 
weapons as a military objective by “improv[ing] strategic stability by pursuing equitable and 
verifiable arms, control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing technologies 
for strategic defense, and strengthening our conventional capabilities.”7 Of course, the Bush 
Administration framed the military objectives in the context of working with their allies 
whenever possible, foreshadowing the future Bush Doctrine of a new world order. The 1990 
NSS further details economic objectives as “ensur[ing] access to foreign markets, energy, 
mineral resources, the oceans, and space.”8 Additionally, the NSS presents a more focused 
methodology for its relations with Europe and its allies, stating that the United States should 
“work with our allies in the North Atlantic Alliance and fully utilize the processes of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security, and 




out the broad interests of the United States and then further focuses on specific objectives that 
the administration wished to pursue. The objectives are specific enough to give direction while 
retaining a degree of flexibility. The objectives also cover a wide range of short-term and long-
term goals. This suitably satisfies the first requirement of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
 The 1990 National Security Strategy contains three separate chapters describing the uses 
of national power in order to connect means and ends. The first chapter entitled “Relating Means 
to Ends: Our Political Agenda” begins with asserting the need for alliances and a reliance on 
them in implementing President Bush’s vision. The NSS states that “Our first priority in foreign 
policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends. … We are prepared to share more fully with 
our allies and friends the responsibilities of global leadership.”10 Though this was published prior 
to the more complete doctrine of a new world order, this leading segment on alliances already 
demonstrates the beginnings of this policy. Additionally, this example expresses a means for 
achieving objectives utilizing the political component of national power.  
President Bush pursues this wholehearted effort at achieving national objectives through 
international cooperation when he emphasizes the importance of arms control. The NSS 
discusses direct methods of pursuing arms controls, referencing the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START), lowering the level of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), working 
towards continued global bans on chemical weapons, and seeking global cooperation in stopping 
the spread of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. These initiatives all share a common 
theme of global participation and cooperation.
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The 1990 National Security Strategy also states that the spread of information is essential 
for protecting American interests. The NSS asserts that through the free sharing of information, 




will help protect human rights and garner support for democratic governments. Here again, the 
president views political means in an international light, possibly hoping that the spread of 
democracy will ensure peace through the sharing of similar cultures and values.
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In the 1990 NSS, President Bush also discusses economic means to achieve desired 
objectives in the following chapter entitled “Relating Means to Ends: Our Economic Agenda.” 
The NSS states that “[the United States] will pursue a strategy that integrates domestic economic 
policies with a market-opening trade policy, enhanced cooperation among the major industrial 
countries, and imaginative solutions to the problems of the Third World.” More specifically, 
these economic means are: reducing the United States' large deficit, securing favorable trade 
agreements to expand American markets, a necessity of maintaining technological superiority, 
and securing reliable sources of energy. In order to ensure energy security, the United States 
must ensure reliable access to oil from the Persian Gulf, maintain the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve, and promote diversification and development of alternative fuel sources. Again, the 
president places national security in the larger context of global cooperation, setting the stage for 
his future proclamation of a new world order. 
The military resources that President Bush plans to utilize in order to secure his 
objectives are presented in the third chapter on means entitled “Relating Means to Ends: Our 
Defense Agenda.” This chapter focuses on four major themes of utilizing military force – 
deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense, and force projection. Here President Bush devotes 
a great deal of time to outlining how to avoid both conventional and nuclear war through 
balanced force strength, collective defense, and maintaining a forward presence. The NSS points 




The Soviet Union continues to modernize its strategic forces across the board. Even as 
START promises to reduce numbers substantially, the qualitative competition has not 
ended. Decisions on strategic modernization that I have already made take advantage of 
the most promising technologies in each leg of our Triad to increase stability. The B-2 
bomber will ensure our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses and fulfill the role the bomber 
force has played so successfully for forty years. The D-5 missile in Trident submarines 
will exploit the traditionally high survivability of this leg and add a significant ability to 
attack more hardened targets. In a two-phase program for our ICBM force, the 
deployment of the Rail Garrison System will enhance stability by removing Peacekeeper 
missiles from vulnerable silos and providing the mobile capability we need for the near 
term. In the second phase, deployment of the small ICBM road-mobile system will 
further strengthen stability and increase force flexibility. While we will ensure that each 
leg of the Triad is as survivable as possible, the existence of all three precludes the 
destruction of more than one by surprise attack and guards against a technological 




President Bush explicitly connects well-defined military means and ends throughout this section 
of the NSS. While not all of the recommendations are as detailed as the above example, they do 
nevertheless round out President Bush’s strategic plan of how to best utilize the various aspects 
of national power to obtain the objectives that he has set for the United States. Through doing 
this, his 1990 National Security Strategy adeptly fulfills the third requirement stipulated by 
Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act regarding composition of the National Security 
Strategy Report. 
The second requirement of Section 603 regarding international relations and defense 
capabilities closely resembles the fourth requirement, which analyzes the overall status of the 
United States’ capabilities of national power concerning securing national interests. They both 
direct the president to analyze the capabilities of available resources for promoting national 
interests and security while placing them in the larger international context. President Bush 
discusses the breadth of United States worldwide commitments and foreign policy relations in 
the chapter “Regional Challenges and Responses.” This section broadly covers American 




For instance, when discussing East Asia and the Pacific, the NSS presents American relations 
stating that “the U.S. security commitment to the Republic of Korea remains firm; we seek a 
reduction in tensions on the Korean peninsula and fully endorse Seoul's efforts to open a fruitful 
South-North dialogue. Our strong and healthy ties with our ally Australia contribute directly to 
regional and global stability.”14 The entire section is structured in this manner, presenting a brief 
but conclusive overview of the worldwide relationships of the United States.  
The NSS also analyzes American capacity to exert national power. This analysis is spread 
throughout the document, mostly localized to the chapters on “Relating Means to Ends.” 
Considering military power, the president muses on the capabilities of forward forces stating that 
“operational restrictions on our forces overseas are also increasing, some of which we can 
accommodate with new training and technologies, but others of which may eventually reduce the 
readiness of our deployed units.”15 The president also considers the technological capabilities of 
the United States as they relate to economic power stating that “the United States remains in the 
forefront in the development of new technologies, but American enterprises must respond more 
quickly in their exploitation of new technologies if they are to maintain their competitiveness in 
both domestic and foreign markets.”16 Throughout the strategy report, President Bush 
acknowledges American capabilities. However, this point could benefit from a more explicit and 
succinct listing of the capabilities as opposed to passing comments regarding capacities of 
national power. This observation aside, the 1990 National Security Strategy demonstrates that 
considerations have been made regarding the ability of available resources to carry out the means 
described in the strategic plan. Additionally, a broad discussion of foreign relations has provided 
context for the United States in the world and has concluded the second and fourth requirements 




 Fulfilling the obligations for a national security strategy outlined in Goldwater-Nichols 
quickly sets a strategic plan on the correct course for executing the Tenets of Strategic Planning. 
The 1990 NSS is no exception to this standard. By completing the four Goldwater-Nichols 
requirements for an NSS, the 1990 NSS satisfied the first four tenets: utilizing all forms of 
national power; plausible evaluation of capabilities and resources; having explicitly defined 
objectives and correlating means; and include both short-term and long-term objectives. 
However, the last three tenets have yet been covered. 
 The fifth tenet, accounting for public opinion, is largely discussed in the final chapter of 
the 1990 NSS entitled “A Public Trust.” The president commences with his bid to earn public 
approval stating that “as our defense efforts adapt to changing circumstances, our people must be 
confident that their defense dollars are efficiently and effectively supporting the cause of 
peace.”17 President Bush outlines his justification for spending taxpayers’ money on the 
objectives outlined in the beginning of the 1990 National Security Strategy. His bid for the will 
of the people in carrying out his plan is covered by a summary of the “Defense Management 
Review” that he undertook shortly after entering office. This initiative sought to make the 
Department of Defense more efficient and cost-effective. President Bush outlined several of the 
components of the review that needed to be addressed such as reducing overhead costs, 
increasing program performance, reducing micromanagement, strengthening the defense 
industrial base, and improving observation of ethical conduct.
18
 The NSS ends with the 
president’s final bid for approval through his appeal for bi-partisan and intergovernmental 
cooperation in national security matters. He concluded that “I believe there is a national 
consensus in support of a strong foreign and defense policy perhaps broader and deeper than at 




their own cooperation. We owe the American people no less.”19 Whether or not the American 
people were won over by this appeal for unity and public duty is beyond the scope of this 
discussion. However, this chapter of the 1990 NSS clearly demonstrates an application of the 
fifth Tenet of Strategic Planning by considering public opinion. 
 The sixth tenet, accounting for the actions of other actors, was also covered in the 1990 
NSS. While various portions have mentioned or hinted at the actions of outside actors (e.g. other 
nations), President Bush clearly directs the reader’s attention to it in the section on proliferation. 
This section states that “the spread of ever more sophisticated weaponry—including chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons—and of the missiles capable of carrying them represents a 
growing danger to international security. This proliferation exacerbates and fuels regional 
tensions and complicates U.S. defense planning. It poses ever greater dangers to U.S. forces and 
facilities abroad, and possibly even to the United States itself.”20 This aptly presents an 
understanding that the actions of other nations must be incorporated into strategic planning. 
 The final Tenet of Strategic Planning notes that a proper strategic plan necessitates a 
certain degree of flexibility and adaptability over time. The 1990 National Security Strategy 
clearly demonstrates this through a comparison with the 1991 National Security Strategy. The 
1991 NSS is remarkably similar to its predecessor, copying entire sections of text word-for-
word. The majority of the 1991 NSS is near identical to the 1990 NSS, with minor updates. With 
the core strategy (means and ends) being transferred relatively intact, this demonstrates that the 
1990 strategic plan maintained a degree of adaptability; it could be incrementally updated to 
meet new challenges and, thus, be qualified as a true strategic plan. 
 Throughout the 1990 National Security Strategy, President Bush attempted to outline 




acknowledged the diminishing power of the Soviet Union and the rapidly changing dynamic of 
the east-west international system. The president outlined how the new world order would 
necessitate a new approach to diplomacy stating that “a multipolar world, in which military 
factors may recede to the background, puts a new premium on the instrumentalities of political 
relations—of which foreign assistance has been one of the most cost-effective and valuable.”21 
This summarizes where the president believed that strategic direction was shifting to; a world 
reliant on open hands instead of clenched fists. As the Cold War ended, the president looked 
ahead for how to handle the balance of world power, hoping that economic assistance would go 
further than massive military buildups. With this outlook, the 1991 National Security Strategy 
was produced. 
 The 1991 National Security Strategy shares numerous similarities with its predecessor, 
one of which was its tardy publication. Don Snider concludes that the NSS release in August of 
1991 was mostly due to the crisis in the Middle East and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
22
 In 
1990, Germany reunified and the Baltic States declared their independence. Communist regimes 
across Eastern Europe fell concluding with the complete collapse of the Soviet Union. While the 
bipolar Cold War system was collapsing, Saddam Hussein attempted to exploit the situation by 
invading the neighboring kingdom of Kuwait. President Bush utilized his vision for a new world 
order by gathering international support for the expulsion of Iraqi forces. Beginning in early 
1991, the United States led an international coalition to expel Hussein from Kuwait. This 
demonstrated the beginnings of a new post-Cold War paradigm where the United States directed 
international affairs as the sole hegemon. The 1991 NSS needed to address these changes 




resulted in, as previously mentioned, a national security strategy remarkably similar to the one 
published the previous year, with a few updates reflecting recent international events. 
One major update occurs in the Preface to the 1991 NSS. It is here where the president 
clearly illustrates his vision for a new world order and stipulates that it will be the guiding 
principle throughout the NSS. President Bush states, “A new world order is not a fact; it is an 
aspiration—and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility that few 
generations have enjoyed—to build a new international system in accordance with our own 
values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us.”23 The president ties 
together his previous allusions to this multi-polar international system of cooperation led by the 
United States. While this vision has already been guiding President Bush’s strategy, it has now 
been coherently and concisely presented. 
 The rest of the document follows a slightly different approach. While the Preface took 
many ideas already stated and blended them into a coherent vision, the rest of the document 
takes the published strategic plan and updates wording as needed. For instance, in discussing the 
state of Eastern Europe, the 1990 NSS stated that “the United States and its allies are dedicated 
to overcoming the division of Europe. All the countries of Eastern Europe are entitled to become 
part of the worldwide commonwealth of free nations. … Overcoming this division depends on 
their achievement of self-determination and independence.”24 The situation in Europe since this 
statement has changed somewhat with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and withdrawal of 
Soviet military forces. Therefore, the 1991 NSS updates the status of Eastern Europe, stating that 
“all across the Continent, the barriers that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. East 
Europeans are determining their own destinies, choosing freedom and economic liberty.”25 Aside 




maintains the essential elements of the previous NSS including, but not limited to, the core 
means and ends. Because of this near-facsimile, the 1991 NSS retains its predecessor’s 
adherence to the requirements in Goldwater-Nichols as well as completing all of the Tenets of 
Strategic Planning except for one. 
 The 1991 NSS fails to transfer directly the verbatim that fulfilled the fifth tenet of 
accounting for public opinion. This resulted from the major change that occurred in the updated 
document. The final chapter of the 1990 NSS, “A Public Trust,” was replaced by a new chapter 
entitled “Toward the 21st Century.” In the closing paragraphs of this final chapter, the president 
presents a new appeal to the public opinion of the American people, replacing the bid for 
approval in the 1990 NSS. President Bush declared that “In this country we make such choices 
for peace just as we make the awful choices of war — as a democracy. … Divided, we will 
invite disasters. United, we can overcome any challenge. In the Gulf, the dictator guessed wrong 
when he doubted America's unity and will. The extraordinary unity we showed as a Nation in the 
Gulf assured that we would prevail.”26 This consideration for the public opinion of the American 
people completes the 1991 NSS as a proper strategic plan. 
 Up to this point, President Bush and his administration have successfully published two 
consecutive national security strategies that adhere to the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols and 
are properly formulated strategic plans according to the Tenets of Strategic Planning. 
Unfortunately, this is where his triumph in strategic planning ends. The 1993 National Security 
Strategy is by all accounts a failure of strategic planning. The 1993 NSS is a farewell address 
and, at best, a strategic recommendation; the president evaluates his time in the White House as 




 The 1993 NSS is an appraisal of the Bush Administration’s achievements. It uses these as 
a foundation to peer out at the world and describe the challenges that still exist in it. The first 
chapter, "The World As It Is ... Our National Security Challenges and Opportunities," reads like 
a strategic recommendation for the incoming administration. It sounds like President Bush 
reminiscing on lost opportunities for what he would have wanted to accomplish with another 
term in office. The result materializes as an outgoing president attempting to convince his 
successor as to what the future political direction for the United States should be: "We must seize 
our opportunities, both for the benefits that will accrue to us, and to further the prospects for 
peace, stability, and prosperity that can and should be shared by others around the globe. We 
must lead because we cannot otherwise hope to achieve a more democratic and peaceful future in 




After endeavoring to dictate direction to the incoming administration, the document 
proposes a handful of “objectives” under the umbrella of a broad interest, stating that “the United 
States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its 
fundamental values, institutions, and people.”28 However, it does not follow up with specific 
objectives, offering vague goals such as seeking “open, democratic and representative political 
systems worldwide” or “an open international trading and economic system which benefits all 
participants.”29 In the two previous NSSs, Bush listed specific objectives; the 1993 NSS only 
presents four unclear “objectives.” However, it may be more appropriate to label them as 
national interests than as ends for directing a strategic plan. Overall, these “objectives” fail to 




The first attempt to reference means for the proposed ends occurs in the chapter "The 
Promotion Of Peace And Democracy … Our Policy Agenda." This chapter is obviously an 
allusion to the chapters on political means from the previous two NSSs. However, unlike the 
preceding NSSs, the 1993 NSS offers only three broad recommendations for pursuing American 
interests through a diplomatic agenda. One of these describes American support for the spread of 
democracy: 
We must also work to support, encourage, and consolidate democracy elsewhere around 
the world, both multilaterally and bilaterally. Our tools include a vigorous public 
diplomacy conducted by the USIA, the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, and successful assistance programs focused on democratic institution-building 
such as the National Endowment for Democracy and the International Military Education 
and Training program. These efforts should continue. We should strive to bring stable 
democracy and free markets to lands that have little knowledge of them, strengthen 
democratic institutions where they are fragile and threatened. Where authoritarianism still 
dominates, we should continue to explain ourselves and to provide factual information 
and hope. Maintaining our own high standard of democratic practice and the rule of law 




This example offers a glimmer of hope for presenting specific means correlating to explicit 
objectives, but ultimately does not deliver clear-cut ideas and explanation – only generalized 
recommendation. 
The next chapter, "Economic Progress At Home And Opportunities Abroad … Our 
Economic Agenda," provides a list of economic objectives. Ideally, this list would have been 
located in a preface or introductory chapter delineating all of the interests and goals. Yet, aside 
from this organizational quibble, it remains unfortunate that this chapter fails to follow its 
outlined objectives with any methodologies for pursing them. This chapter, like the previous 




The chapter on military means, “Security Through Strength: Legacy and Mandate … Our 
Defense Agenda,” provides excellent descriptions of the core national security issues and how 
the Bush Administration handled them. While offering an appraisal of the Bush Administration 
on these issues, the 1993 NSS stumbles into an objective that Bush failed to accomplish: “A 
major unfinished item on the arms control agenda, to which the United States attaches the 
highest priority, is the banning of chemical weapons. The best hope of achieving the worldwide 
elimination of chemical weapons and of stemming proliferation at the same time is to bring into 
force the Chemical Weapons Convention.”31 The chapter follows this pattern, presenting what 
Bush wanted to accomplish as a recommendation to the future administration. However, it still 
does not elaborate on how to achieve those unfinished goals. 
The 1993 NSS also falls short of previous NSS standards is describing American 
worldwide commitments and foreign relations. While these are at times referenced offhand, there 
is no chapter solely devoted to the discussion of American relations with other nations. The only 
coherent discussion of this is two brief one-and-a-half-page descriptions of America's regional 
interests that are attached to the end of the chapters on political and military means. For example, 
the entire discussion of America’s relationship with the Middle East Region pertaining to 
military means is only a single paragraph:  
In the Middle East and South Asia, we will maintain forces deployed in the region, 
expand our bilateral defense arrangements, preposition materiel and equipment, and 
conduct joint and combined exercises to defend the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of our partners in the region. We will continue to work to assure 





The brevity of each attachment and regional description fails to properly analyze, or describe in 




Where the previous NSSs were prescriptive in dictating how to achieve the clear ends by 
enumerating specific means, the 1993 NSS only offers generalized recommendations. Without 
clear objectives, a strategic plan cannot possibly provide specific means to match. Furthermore, a 
plan would therefore be unable to supply an adequate appraisal of capabilities regarding means 
and ends. Without properly formatted means and ends, the core of strategy is missing from the 
1993 NSS. Additionally, as it spends much time touting previous achievements, it is very 
unlikely that any future president would utilize it for a future iteration of strategy. As such, along 
with it being published days before leaving office, this strategic plan was dead on arrival. Thus, 
without the basic components of strategy, the 1993 NSS cannot possibly fulfill the requirements 
established by Goldwater-Nichols or the Tenets of Strategic Planning. 
The 1993 National Security Strategy fails to meet the necessary conditions to be 
considered a strategic plan by any definition. The document disregards means and ends, instead 
discussing “agendas” which at times read more like a pie-in-the-sky wish-list offering a few 
prescriptive ideas for checking items off the list. Don Snider commented on the 1993 NSS 
stating that “Unlike the previous reports in both the Reagan and Bush administrations, this one 
was intended quite clearly to document the accomplishments of the past rather than to point to 
the way ahead. … They wanted to document their accomplishments in strategic terms, as well as 
to put down markers by which the Clinton administration's foreign policy could be judged.”33 
The document accomplishes these aspects. Unfortunately, these are not elements of a strategic 
plan. 
Aside from the strategic failure of 1993, the Bush Administration created two exceptional 
strategic plans during its tenure in the White House. It was able to articulate specific objectives 




trappings of an evolving Bush Doctrine of a new world order. The National Security Strategies 
of the Bush Administration contained a largely outward perspective on national interests, 
choosing foreign over domestic issues. Chair of International Strategic Studies and Professor of 
International Relations at Claremont McKenna College and Claremont Graduate University, P. 
Edward Haley praised the administration:  
[President George H. W. Bush] preserved a balance between commitments and 
capabilities by limiting what it attempted to do, and assuring that when it tried for 
ambitious goals, its policies were widely supported by other governments. As a result, 
even while cutting the size of the American military and reducing the defense budget, the 
administration found it relatively easy to accomplish its goals and its achievements were 
generally popular and widely regarded as legitimate.”34  
 
 
Foreign policy found many successes; it brought the United States to victory in the Gulf War and 
assisted in transitioning the world through the end of the Cold War. President Bush 
accomplished all of this utilizing his new world order and widespread international cooperation. 
His strategy to seek international support and rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe also found success. The next administration would build on these foundations of strategy 
established by President Bush, but would ultimately take a decidedly more economic and 
domestic approach when determining which national interests should guide future strategy. 
                                                 
1. P. Edward Haley, Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 42. 
 
2. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 363-364. 
 
3. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 400. 
 
4. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, 2nd ed. (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), 8. Snider worked as Director of Defense 
Policy on the National Security Council for the Bush and Reagan Presidencies and helped author the National 





                                                                                                                                                             
5. George H. W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1990), v. 
 
6. Bush, NSS, 1990, 2-3. 
 
7. Bush, NSS, 1990, 2. 
 
8. Bush, NSS, 1990, 2. 
 
9. Bush, NSS, 1990, 3. 
 
10. Bush, NSS, 1990, 15. 
 
11. Bush, NSS, 1990, 15-18. 
 
12. Bush, NSS, 1990, 18. 
 
13. Bush, NSS, 1990, 24. 
 
14. Bush, NSS, 1990, 12. 
 
15. Bush, NSS, 1990, 25. 
 
16. Bush, NSS, 1990, 22. 
 
17. Bush, NSS, 1990, 31. 
 
18. Bush, NSS, 1990, 31-32. 
 
19. Bush, NSS, 1990, 32. 
 
20. Bush, NSS, 1990, 17. 
 
21. Bush, NSS, 1990, 18. 
 
22. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, 8-9. 
 
23. George H. W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1991), v.  
 
24. Bush, NSS, 1990, 11. 
 
25. Bush, NSS, 1991, 6. 
 
26. Bush, NSS, 1991, 34. 
 
27. George H. W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 1993), 2. 
 
28. Bush, NSS, 1993, 3. 
 




                                                                                                                                                             
 
30. Bush, NSS, 1993, 6. 
 
31. Bush, NSS, 1993, 17. 
 
32. Bush, NSS, 1993, 20. 
 
33. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision, 9-10. 
 





ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT 
 
I believe as strongly as I can say that just as your military strength permits America to 
have diplomatic strength, so that national security is both military and diplomatic, 
national security is also being strong at home as well as being strong abroad. And there is 
no longer a clear dividing line between what is foreign policy and what is domestic 
policy, not when everybody’s job depends on whether we can compete in a global 
economy. 
—William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the Military Community at Hickam Air Force Base in 
Honolulu, Hawaii,” November 16, 1994. 
 
 Bill Clinton published seven National Security Strategies out of his eight years as 
President of the United States. The next closest was George H. W. Bush with three National 
Security Strategies. No other president since has come close to the frequency and regularity of 
issuing strategy reports. Yet for the success in regularity, the Clinton Administration took a long 
time getting started. The first NSS was not released in its final draft until July of 1994, a year and 
a half into his first term. Clinton’s 1994 National Security Strategy was the result of a lengthy 
process for a new administration trying to find its way through the morass of establishing a 
vision for national strategy. Yet, aside from the delay in its release, the 1994 NSS was a success 
in strategic planning. Furthermore, Clinton perpetuated this success to each of the six iterations 
of his strategic plan. 
 While trying to create a coherent vision for national strategy, Clinton faced a number of 
contentious international issues. In October 1993, the Battle of Mogadishu fought in the African 
nation of Somalia resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers. The American public voiced 
their disapproval of the administration over the debacle. The Clinton Administration’s foreign 




Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Clinton chose not to commit American forces, consequently 
drawing much public criticism. These events in Africa left the nation questioning Clinton’s 
foreign policy acumen.  
President Clinton got off to a rough start with strategic planning. Don Snider, who 
worked on the 1994 NSS as well as NSSs for Reagan and Bush, noted that Clinton’s first 
strategy report went through 21 drafts.
1
 Snider attributes this to the fact that “it took a long time 
for the administration to settle on a set of principles from which to design and implement a 
consistent foreign policy.”2 President Clinton campaigned largely on domestic and economic 
issues. Foreign relations and national security are points that the administration had to develop 
along the way while handling contentious international situations. Clearly, President Clinton was 
struggling to develop a vision for the United States that married his domestic and foreign 
policies. 
The White House exhibited a lack of confidence in its initial attempt at defining national 
strategy through the multiple drafts of the 1994 NSS, the length of time it took in constructing a 
comprehensive strategy, and the manner in which it released the document. In his New York 
Times article, political columnist William Safire recalled the issuing of the NSS:  
[The 1994 NSS] has been kept secret by the fiendishly clever device of making it public. 
Issued a month ago in the dead of night, the blue-covered "National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement" was dubbed "the En-En Document" by engaging reporters 
and enlarged pundits. The struggle over naming the policy engagement (a Gary Hart term 
favored by the State Department) vs. enlargement (a Tony Lake term favored by the 
N.S.C. staff) was resolved in a quintessentially Clintonian way: Both are used, conjuring 




Safire illustrated the difficult beginning of strategic planning for the Clinton Administration. 




“the strategy document, an annual report to Congress that normally gets scant public attention, 
has assumed new importance because it marks the Clinton administration's first attempt to 
describe its foreign policy strategy in a comprehensive way and because it carries implications 
for defense budgets and foreign aid.”4 The administration’s attempt at avoiding media scrutiny 
with a late night release in the hope that the document might fly under the radar failed to achieve 
the desired results – the 1994 NSS received much wider press coverage than any previous NSS 
release, partially due to the importance of it being the first comprehensive statement declaring 
the administration’s foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, Safire asserted that Clinton’s 
groundwork for a strategic vision of ‘engagement and enlargement’ was actually the result of 
timidity in establishing national strategy. Whether or not this is true, the explanation fits well 
with circumstances surrounding the publishing of the 1994 NSS and the administration’s struggle 
to establish coherent foreign policy. 
 The Clinton Administration also stepped away from the traditional titling of their first 
NSS, designating it “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” This title 
left no one guessing as to the core principles that President Clinton was trying to set as the 
cornerstone of his vision for national strategy. Yet, what does “engagement and enlargement” 
really mean? Professors of Political Science Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross concisely 
defined it stating: “the phrase ‘engagement and enlargement’ conveys both the mode and the 
purpose, or vision, of the strategy: the United States must be engaged in the world to enlarge the 
community of democratic free-market countries.”5 This approach places economic interests at 
the forefront of national strategy.  
The theme “engagement and enlargement” represented a continuation of engagement 




policy. Lieutenant Colonel Winters writing for The Army Lawyer stated that “the annual United 
States National Security Strategy continues Bush administration ‘engagement’ strategies that 
evolved after Soviet hegemony collapsed in 1989 to 1990. … Notably, the strategy expands from 
traditional notions of national security (such as national defense) into domestic forums such as 
the environment, research and development, and investment.”6 The Clinton Administration 
adhered to the long-term trend in U.S. national strategy, while advancing it with his own 
platform of economic expansion. Clinton believed that the domestic economy was intrinsically 
linked to the global market. Therefore, domestic economic reform played a crucial role for 
Clinton in directing national strategy. The most notable example of this is the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which Clinton signed into law on January 1, 1994. President 
Clinton viewed NAFTA as an opportunity to expand the domestic economy by removing 
international trade barriers. It was hoped that this free trade zone would encourage economic 
growth and consequently result in more American jobs.  
President Clinton attempted to bring his vision for the United States into action through 
his 1994 National Security Strategy. The 1994 NSS continues the worldwide “engagement” of 
the Bush Administration while also placing domestic economic issues at the core of its strategic 
vision. The 1994 NSS begins with a declaration of principles to lend structure to the president’s 
plan: 
We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, 
and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are more likely to 
support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with growing economies 
and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And 
democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate 







This statement of purpose also illustrates the three components of power that the ends and means 
will be coalesced into – security, economic prosperity, and the spread of democracy. 
 While the 1994 National Security Strategy establishes broad categories for ends and 
means, the document does not separate the ends and means into “to-do lists” like the Bush 
Administration. The chapter titled “Advancing our Interests Through Engagement and 
Enlargement” broadly describes some objectives in the introduction: 
We will continue to pursue arms control agreements to reduce the danger of nuclear 
conflict and promote stability. … A vigorous and integrated economic policy designed to 
stimulate global environmentally sound economic growth and free trade and to press for 
open and equal U.S. access to foreign markets. … Our efforts focus on preserving 
democratic processes in key emerging democratic states including Russia, Ukraine and 




The rest of the chapter blends the ends and means without explicitly separating and listing the 
objectives. Often the means are discussed in detail, but the objectives are rarely clearly 
ascertained. Reading closely and “between the lines” the public may discern the specific 
objectives that the Clinton Administration is aiming for, but this may be another instance of 
Clintonian ambiguity and an unsure hand in directing foreign policy. However, all of this aside, a 
trained eye can pinpoint some clear-cut political objectives in the 1994 NSS. 
 The document contains several specific military objectives. One example pertains to 
handling weapons of mass destruction, stating that “a key part of our strategy is to seek to stem 
the proliferation of such weapons and to develop an effective capability to deal with these 
threats.”9 In dealing with regional conflict, President Clinton acknowledges that “the United 
States, along with others in the international community, will seek to prevent and contain 
localized conflicts before they require a military response.”10 These examples demonstrate a 




acknowledging the increasingly global economy, put domestic economic interests as 
international objectives imploring that “our primary economic goal is to strengthen the American 
economy and reverse the decline in American competitiveness that plagued our international 
economic performance for over a decade.”11The document further elaborates stating that “the 
success of American business is more than ever dependent upon success in international 
markets.”12 The president rounds out his specific objectives by tying together the three threads of 
American national interests: security, economic prosperity, and promotion of democracy, stating 
that “the core of our strategy is to help democracy and markets expand and survive in other 
places where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest 
difference.”13 While not entirely straightforward, the 1994 National Security Strategy contains 
objectives to focus the president’s directive of “engagement and enlargement.” 
 The 1994 NSS devotes much space to the discussion of specific means to accomplish the, 
at times, obscure ends. For uses of military power to inhibit terrorism after the 1993 World Trade 
Center Bombing, the strategic plan declares that “as long as terrorist groups continue to target 
American citizens and interests, the United States will need to have specialized units available to 
defeat such groups. From time to time, we might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their 
bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them.”14 The strategy 
also seeks to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through international 
cooperation in such measures as extending the Nonproliferation Treaty, achieving a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and strengthening and supporting the International Atomic 
Energy Agency.
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 The National Security Strategy even targets specific nations stating that “the 
United States seeks to cap, reduce and, ultimately, eliminate the nuclear and missile capabilities 




Utilizing economic means begins with strengthening the U.S. economy and international 
competitiveness. The Clinton Administration believed that this was best achieved by “reducing 
the federal deficit and the burden it imposes on the economy and future generations.”17 President 
Clinton also sought access to international markets for U.S. exports through international trade 
agreements such as The North American Free Trade Agreement, Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, and U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement. Some of these efforts demonstrated short-
term uses of economic power while others proved to be more long-term. Reiterating his 
economic focus for achieving national interests, President Clinton also argued that “if we can 
support and help consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia (and the other newly 
independent states), we can help turn a former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and 
economic partners. In addition, our efforts in Russia, Ukraine and the other states raise the 
likelihood of continued reductions in nuclear arms and compliance with international 
nonproliferation accords.”18 Overall, the president sought to leverage economic, diplomatic, and 
military means to work towards achieving the objectives included in the 1994 National Security 
Strategy. 
By outlining the means and ends in a coherent plan, President Clinton successfully 
fulfilled the requirements in Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. The 1994 NSS clearly addressed 
the “worldwide interests, goals, and objectives” vital to American national security. These were 
discussed through maintaining a strong military with a worldwide presence, pursuing 
international military and economic agreements, securing American economic prosperity, and 
spreading democracy in the belief of the democratic peace theory.
19
 Furthermore, the objectives 
set forth by the Clinton Administration represented both short-term and long-term uses of a 




The 1994 National Security Strategy also elaborates on the United States and its 
worldwide commitments and foreign relations. In the chapter “Integrated Regional Approaches,” 
President Clinton details American involvement throughout the world, region by region. For 
example, in the portion pertaining to “The Middle East, South and Southwest Asia,” the 
document describes American relations with Iran, stating that “our policy toward Iran is aimed at 
changing the behavior of the Iranian government in several key areas, including Iran's efforts to 
obtain weapons of mass destruction and missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that oppose 
the peace process, its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the region and its dismal 
human rights record. We remain willing to enter into an authoritative dialogue with Iran to 
discuss the differences between us.”20 Throughout this part of the 1994 NSS, the Clinton 
Administration outlines American foreign relations in a regional context with references towards 
specific states, thus fulfilling the Goldwater-Nichols requirement of addressing worldwide 
commitments. 
The final necessary component of Section 603 to be addressed is an evaluation of U.S. 
capabilities to achieve the desired objectives. Appraisals of U.S. capabilities are sprinkled 
throughout the 1994 NSS, but the majority is tied to the discussion of means in “Advancing our 
Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement.” For instance, the document declares that “U.S. 
military capabilities are critical to the success of our strategy. This nation has unparalleled 
military capabilities: the United States is the only nation capable of conducting large-scale and 
effective military operations far beyond its borders.”21 The 1994 NSS also addresses the problem 
of energy security that continues to face the United States as it continues to be reliant on foreign 
oil. The document outlines the issue, noting that “the United States depends on oil for more than 




share of these imports come from the Persian Gulf area.”22 Through describing the capabilities of 
the United States to achieve its national security interests, the 1994 National Security Strategy 
aptly completes the requirements of Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. However, does this 
strategy measure up to the more stringent conditions established by the Tenets of Strategic 
Planning? 
Through executing the requirements of Section 603, the 1994 NSS already completed 
several of the Tenets of Strategy Planning. First, the Clinton Administration clearly looked 
beyond military force and utilized various components of national power. Second, the document 
is plausible in expectations through accounting for the capabilities of the United States to achieve 
its objectives. Third, while not as explicit as the previous administration, the 1994 NSS 
nevertheless contains articulated ends correlated with precise means. Fourth, the strategy 
demonstrates a mixture of short-term and long-term goals. While these four guidelines put the 
1994 National Security Strategy on track to completing the Tenets of Strategic Planning, the 
final three tenets have yet to be addressed. 
The fifth tenet relates to accounting for the will of the people. President Clinton addresses 
this from the outset; in the Preface he declares that “I am committed to building a new public 
consensus to sustain our active engagement abroad. This document is a part of that 
commitment.”23 His bid for public approval continues into the first section of the document: 
We can only engage actively abroad if the American people and the Congress are willing 
to bear the costs of that leadership - in dollars, political energy and, at times, American 
lives. In a democracy, the foreign policy of the nation must serve the needs of the people. 
… One purpose of this report is to help foster the broad, bipartisan understanding and 
support necessary to sustain our international engagement. Congressional participation is 







President Clinton plainly accounts for public opinion, commencing with bids for public approval 
numerous times at the beginning of the document, and throughout the remainder of it as well. 
 The next tenet dictates that a strategic plan goes beyond its national boundaries and 
account for the actions of outside actors, such as NGOs, terrorist groups, or other nations. The 
1994 NSS considers the sixth tenet in such instances as describing terrorism, noting that 
“[terrorists] have the advantage of being able to take the initiative in the timing and choice of 
targets.”25 The 1994 NSS also considers other international incidents stating that “the murderous 
conflict in Yugoslavia reminds us that military forces remain relevant in a post-Cold War 
world.”26 These examples are not exhaustive of the Clinton Administration’s understanding that 
strategy does not occur in a vacuum, but they demonstrate a fulfillment of the sixth Tenet of 
Strategic Planning.  
 As with previous administrations, the final tenet necessitating that a strategic plan 
exhibits longevity through flexibility and adaptability over time is best realized through a 
comparison of the 1994 National Security Strategy with its successive iterations. The 1995 
National Security Strategy is a near-reprint of the 1994 NSS, demonstrating the flexibility of 
strategic planning in the Clinton Administration.
27
 The 1995 NSS changes little from the 
previous year; it updates the list of administration achievements, highlighting such accolades as 
the NATO Partnership for Peace, START II Treaty, creation of nearly six million U.S. jobs, 
approval for NAFTA, and working with the U.N. to reverse a coup in Haiti.
28
 The means and 
ends described remain the same with the exception that some treaty initiatives have been 
concluded and some new treaties have been introduced. These changes are in name only; the 
means of utilizing international diplomacy to achieve the same ends of security, free-trade, and 




1995 National Security Strategies, it can easily be deduced that the 1995 NSS also fulfills the 
requirements of both Goldwater-Nichols and the Tenets of Strategic Planning. 
 A similar case may be made for the next iteration of President Clinton’s national strategy 
in the 1996 NSS, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.”29 The core 
ends and means are again transferred almost exactly as before, with the exception of minor 
updates to specifics such as certain international incidents or treaties, as well as the increasingly 
long list of achievements that the Clinton Administration wished to acknowledge. However, the 
1996 NSS does add a few new objectives. The 1996 document identifies international organized 
crime as a threat to national security, and therefore one of the new objectives is to eradicate this 
threat wherever possible. President Clinton tasked the Justice Department with drafting 
legislation for Congress to expand the powers of United States Government Agencies to pursue 
these criminal enterprises. The president also wished to obtain international help combating the 
spread of organized crime as it was taking hold in the power vacuum left in former Soviet states, 
where the main concern was the sale of old Soviet military hardware and weapons of mass 
destruction.
30
 Another initiative the president proposed in the 1996 NSS regards national security 
emergency preparedness. With the threat of major national disasters or terrorist acts, the nation 
needs to have emergency response measures in place to handle the crises as they develop. As 
such, President Clinton charged all Federal Departments with implementing emergency 
preparedness plans.
31
 The only other major update to this strategic plan has been to expand the 
means of increasing American exports in order to sustain economic development.
32
 Again, this 
economic objective is not new to his strategic plan, but it bears note that the president has put 




to the National Security Strategy do not alter the 1996 NSS from adhering to Goldwater-Nichols 
conditions or the Tenets of Strategic Planning. 
 Following the 1996 elections, President Clinton returned to office retaining the principles 
of security, economy, and democracy for national strategy. However, he decided to shake things 
up a bit. The 1997 National Security Strategy title was changed to “A National Security Strategy 
for a New Century.”33 He also transformed the look and format of the document. Yet, for all of 
the aesthetic alterations and title change, the core means and ends remained the same. The 1997 
NSS largely follows the trend of successful iterations by maintaining the essential structure, with 
only minor cosmetic updates to reflect the developments in world events. The president outlines 
six broad objectives guiding the 1997 National Security Strategy:  
Foster an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe; forge a strong and stable Asia 
Pacific community; continue America's leadership as the world's most important force for 
peace; create more jobs and opportunities for Americans through a more open and 
competitive trading system that also benefits others around the world; increase 
cooperation in confronting new security threats that defy borders and unilateral solutions; 




This may sound like an ambitious new plan for the United States, but in reality these are all old 
objectives. The objectives have been dusted off, reworded, and injected into the 1997 NSS to 
appear as though they are novel and exciting initiatives. However, after reading the document 
and noting all of the similar specific ends and means, sometimes still retaining the exact phrasing 
of previous National Security Strategies, it becomes readily apparent that it is nothing new, but 
merely an iteration with the traditional revisions to bring the strategy up-to-date. Overall, the 
“Strategy for a New Century” sounds enticing and looks like a fresh take on national strategy, 
but in reality it continues the pattern of the Clinton NSSs, still adhering to the requirements of 




 The 1998 and 1999 National Security Strategies also continue the previous iterations, but 
with a couple of exceptions.
35
 These NSSs stress a much more integrated and wide-ranging use 
of national power supported by a reliance on diplomacy, United States foreign assistance 
programs, and cooperation with international law enforcement to achieve national objectives. 
Through the progression of national strategies, President Clinton built up the importance of 
protecting the environment, supporting humanitarian aid initiatives, and looking to the World 
Trade Organization for expanding American trade with open-trade and fair-trade programs. 
These ideas take a more prominent role in the 1998 and 1999 editions than in previous National 
Security Strategies, with the foundational ends and means remaining intact. 
 The 2000 National Security Strategy, titled “A National Security Strategy for a Global 
Age,” represents a marriage between a successive iteration in the progression of Clinton 
Administration National Security Strategies and George H. W. Bush’s 1993 “farewell speech” 
NSS.
36
 The 2000 NSS restructures much of the familiar language of “engagement,” focusing on 
security, economics, democracy, and now human rights (the “enlargement” terminology has 
since been dropped, but the principles retained). With the reorganization of President Clinton’s 
2000 NSS, though still containing some of the similar ends and means, it has taken on a different 
tone. No longer does it read like a strategic plan, but more like a mission statement; a document 
full of principles, theories, and values as opposed to a straightforward plan of action. This 
iteration of the document now contains chapters on “Elements of the Strategy,” “Guiding 
Principles of Engagement,” and “The Efficacy of Engagement.” These chapters appear to be the 
Clinton Administration’s explanation of strategic theory and principles by means of the 
accomplishments of President Clinton’s time in office. For instance, the 2000 NSS reminisces on 




post-Cold War international system by encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, 
and sustainable development. These efforts have produced measurable results. The number of 
democracies, as a percentage of world states, has increased by 14% since 1992. For the first time 
in history, over half of the world's population lives under democratic governance.”37 These first 
parts of the document read in a manner such as this, speaking about abstract principles and 
attempting to correlate them to real world success stories for the administration. 
If readers can make it past the initial abstractions and self-congratulatory notes, the 
readers will find themselves in familiar territory. The 2000 NSS returns to all of the recognizable 
themes of past strategic plans from the Clinton Administration, discussing ends and means of 
such topics as diplomacy, arms control, international crime, combating terrorism, promoting 
open trade, increasing exports, and humanitarian activities. The most notable difference in the 
chapter on objectives is the amount of space dedicated to humanitarian endeavors. In this 
iteration of national strategy, the discussion regarding the spread of democracy has been 
expanded to include human rights as a vital component. This aspect of American national 
interests has grown over the course of President Clinton’s second term. The document describes 
the president’s goals, stating that “our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are 
complemented by our humanitarian programs, which are designed to alleviate human suffering, 
address resource and economic crises that could have global implications, and pursue appropriate 
strategies for economic development.”38 The aspirations of the administration to intervene on 
moral and humanitarian grounds have often been described as the “Clinton Doctrine.”39 Yet, 
aside from a few changes, the 2000 NSS continues the administration’s adherence to the Tenets 




 The Clinton Administration followed some of the examples of the Bush Administration 
in setting strategy. The Clinton Administration defined its national strategy in an initial 
document, and carried that core vision throughout a progression of modified strategic plans. Like 
the previous administration, President Clinton’s National Security Strategies never hesitated to 
point out administration successes. While many similarities surely existed, President Clinton also 
deviated from the norms established by Reagan and Bush. 
 Primarily, President Clinton gave unique titles to his National Security Strategies. Also, 
the administration attempted to differentiate itself in its methods of developing strategy through 
connecting domestic economic policies to the larger international context of national strategic 
planning. The Clinton Administration attempted to exploit its foreign policy platform to advance 
domestic interests. No longer was national strategy solely intent on protecting American interests 
abroad, but now it was also utilized as a means for developing national interests at home. The 
reliance on economics, diplomacy, democratic values, and, eventually, humanitarian causes, 
defined the Clinton Era National Security Strategies and provided a stark contrast to previous 
approaches to national strategy. 
 Clinton also received more media scrutiny concerning strategic planning than previous 
presidents. The increased media attention garnered some harsh criticism of the “engagement and 
enlargement” strategy. Writing for The Washington Post, foreign policy analyst Dimitri Simes 
criticized the administration’s strategy, stating that “too often, Clinton's foreign policy is guided 
by sentimental paternalism. Behind the notions of an ‘enlargement’ of democracy, nation-
building and humanitarian intervention, one can detect a well-meaning but arrogant temptation to 
fix other people's problems. The temptation is based on the unspoken belief that America knows 




This critique holds some value in that the United States should not police the world, however, the 
democratic peace theory appears to contradict Simes and justify Clinton’s national strategy, often 
finding long-term success if nations can make the democratic transition. 
 Not all critics of Clintonian Strategy take such a negative stance towards the initiatives. 
P. Edward Haley, Chair of International Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, 
asserts that “there was a strategy. It was imaginative and innovative. … Seeing no serious threats 
to American security, Clinton’s strategy identified improving the domestic and world economy 
as the primary responsibilities of the United States. Success in these two actions would do more 
than any other measure to make the world safer, wealthier, and more democratic.”41 Haley 
contends that the only problem confronting President Clinton’s strategy was that it did not 
adequately handle ethnic and religious conflict and Islamic terrorism. The response to these 




 Overall, President Clinton developed a coherent strategic vision during his tenure in the 
Oval Office. He got off to a rough start in developing his strategic plan, but was able to carry it 
through his two terms. President Clinton was also able to bring the topics important to him to the 
forefront of strategy: economic policy and humanitarian interventions. While not perfect, the 
Clinton Administration was able to successfully develop seven strategic plans that represented 
not only the spirit of the law, but also the essence of proper strategic planning. 
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Our nation's cause has always been larger than our nation's defense. We fight, as we 
always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors human liberty. We will defend the 
peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building 
good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging 
free and open societies on every continent. 
—George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in 
West Point, New York,” June 1, 2002 
 
 President George W. Bush entered office in January 2001 after a narrow victory over the 
Democratic Party Candidate Al Gore. Bush, like Clinton, had hoped to tackle domestic issues, 
wanting to focus on national standards for education, economic reforms, stem cell research, and 
uniting a national constituency that was still torn over the controversy surrounding the 2000 
election. However, fate had other plans for Bush. Catastrophic events defined the Bush 
Presidency; the 9/11 terrorist attacks directed his focus from domestic politics to foreign policy 
and Hurricane Katrina forced his attention to cleaning up one of the worst natural disasters in 
U.S. history. Through all of this turmoil, the Bush Administration was able to produce two 
iterations of proper strategic planning. These two National Security Strategies would be the most 
scrutinized in history, largely over one small, yet immensely significant, line declaring 
America’s option for pre-emption. 
 President Bush developed his new vision for American foreign policy over the course of 
his first term. Bush’s vision would come to be defined by the September 11, 2001 terrorist 




West Point commencement speech, Bush described his plan as it evolved from previous Cold 
War strategies: 
For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of 
deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply, but new threats 
also require new thinking. Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations 
– means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. 
Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction 
can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We 
cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in 
the word of tyrants who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties and then systemically 
break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. … 
The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, 
disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have 




President Bush clearly depicted the previous administrations’ strategies of deterrence and 
containment that guided national strategy through the Cold War. He then continued to outline 
why these strategic concepts are out of touch in a new age of tyrants and terrorists that no longer 
adhere to the standards of engagement that defined the Cold War. These new threats require new 
ways of thinking about securing the safety of the United States. It is here that the president began 
to establish the “Bush Doctrine.”  
 The Bush Doctrine guided American foreign policy for the majority of Bush’s tenure as 
president. There was no coherent document presenting a clear definition of the concept, but it 
developed as part of public releases and speeches, such as the West Point Commencement 
Address. In her dissertation on the Bush Doctrine, Pamela Lauren Foerstel Branson defined it as 
“a combination of nationalism and a foreign policy committed to freedom, morality, and 
democracy.”2 The Bush Doctrine sought to spread American economic and democratic ideals to 
provide for a safer world. This initiative sought to foster these goals under the umbrella of 




Doctrine also declared that the United States would act unilaterally in order to secure its national 
interests, even if this meant pre-emptive/preventative use of force.
3
 In an article for The 
Washington Post, James B. Steinberg, who served as Clinton’s deputy national security advisor, 
commented on Bush Administration strategy, stating that “it sees the world as one problem -- 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction -- and builds a strategy around it.”4 These principles 
became enshrined in the Bush Administration’s first centralized pronouncement of its strategic 
vision in the 2002 National Security Strategy. 
President George W. Bush’s first National Security Strategy was released on September 
17, 2002 and was the first public release of a strategic plan in almost three years. While the delay 
in its release failed to follow the stipulated publication deadline set by Goldwater-Nichols, its 
delay may have been for the best because any strategic document released prior to the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks would have been rendered largely obsolete.
5
 However, the delay of its 
release coupled with its cachet as the initial strategic plan following this catastrophic event 
created huge expectations regarding the document’s significance. Furthermore, the new strategic 
direction described in the 2002 NSS generated a media buzz yet unknown to any National 
Security Strategy. 
The media attention focused on the principle regarding preemptive use of force against 
threats to the United States. The 2002 NSS, in discussing preemptive utilization of force, 
justified it through its historical international implementation; states throughout history have 
attacked first when imminent danger, traditionally as threats of conventional forces, have been 
looming. However, the document asserts that this concept of preemption needs to be adapted to 
the new era of rogue states and terrorists. These entities circumvent conventional measures, 




and delivered with little or no warning.
6
 Thus, as its enemies have evolved new methods to 
threaten national security, the United States needs to adapt its strategic doctrine to match: 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt 
emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an 
age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most 




The announcement that the United States would act to preempt an attack through military force 
represented a radical shift in articulated strategy, garnering international media and academic 
attention. 
 In his editorial for The New York Times, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Robert Wright 
noted that “reporters, after wading through 13,000 words on his strategic vision, focused mainly 
on two controversial doctrines: preserving overwhelming American military superiority 
indefinitely; and preemptively attacking nations deemed threatening rather than relying on 
traditional deterrence. Less was said about the more high-minded stuff, like fostering peace, 
prosperity and democracy around the world.”8 Wright noted, that though the media latched onto 
specific controversial doctrines, those doctrines do not accurately represent the entire 2002 
National Security Strategy. Adam Quinn, a Lecturer in International Studies at the University of 
Birmingham, recognized why the media scrutinized the new doctrine to such a degree, stating 
that “indeed, though the term itself [preemption] was used few times in the NSS, and not 
emphasized in the introduction or conclusion, its proclamation was widely depicted as a 




inaugurating a new era of unilateral American militarism.”9 This new policy of preemption 
symbolized the overall theme of the Bush Administration’s attempt to shift into a post-Cold War 
world. The United States as the sole hegemon no longer faced the threat of a bi-polar conflict, or 
even a traditional conventional conflict. The new challenges facing the United States have 
evolved along with the United States’ new position in the world. As such, President Bush in his 
2002 National Security Strategy advocated an equally dramatic strategic shift to confront the 
new threats of the post-Cold War world. 
 The 2002 NSS frames the core of its vision around a marriage of American values and 
national interests with the aim of making the world a safer and better place.
10
 The broad goals 
accompanying this vision are “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other 
states, and respect for human dignity.”11 These goals are broken down into eight more specific 
objectives: 
Champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism 
and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse 
regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, 
with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through 
free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and 
building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with 
other main centers of global power; and transform America’s national security 




Individual chapters are devoted to each of these specific goals. Each chapter discusses the goal 
and the means to accomplish it. 
 The chapter “Preventing Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends, 
with Weapons of Mass Destruction” provides an excellent example for demonstrating how the 
2002 NSS structures ends and means. This chapter further refines its objectives as preventing 




weapons. In this chapter, Bush defines rogue states as repressive regimes that demonstrate 
contempt for the established international order and seek to challenge peaceful nations through 
advanced weaponry and WMDs as well as support for global terrorism. The 2002 NSS declares 
these states a direct threat to the United States, asserting that these rogue states “reject basic 
human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.”13 The document 
lists Iraq and North Korea as fitting the description of a rogue state.  
This chapter of the 2002 NSS also reveals the means that the United States should follow 
to achieve these objectives. It argues that “we must be prepared to stop rogue states and their 
terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened 
alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of 
military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense 
system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.”14 Additional means are 
delineated to combat WMDs: counter proliferation (deterring and defending against WMDs), 
nonproliferation (preventing the production or acquirement of WMDs), and consequence 
management (prepared measures to respond to a WMD attack). However, these methods of 
securing the United States do not go far enough.  
The means implicate a reliance on international cooperation and support, or the hope that 
through intelligence and technology enemy plots will be discovered and halted by established 
legal norms. President Bush needed to take this a step further and clarify that new threats 
necessitated new methods to prevent them. He believed that the National Security Strategy 
needed to explicitly declare that the United States would not sit back and allow a rogue state to 




international law. Therefore, the 2002 NSS announced that one of the ways to prevent an attack 
was to preemptively deter an attack through any means possible, including the use of force.
15
 
This instigation of force radically altered perceived international norms regarding military force 
and international law. This highly controversial method of obtaining national security brought 
much criticism to the National Security Strategy. Yet, while much of the discussion that swirled 
around the 2002 NSS focused on preemption, Robert Wright was correct in his previously cited 
assertion that there was more to the NSS than the declaration of preemption. 
The 2002 National Security Strategy contains other objectives, including a central desire 
of President Bush to champion aspirations for human dignity, or more simply, to spread 
American ideals of democracy and liberty. Means of achieving this are listed as: utilizing 
diplomatic measures through international organizations; leveraging foreign aid for non-violent 
democratic transitions; pressing allies to promote democratic reform; and taking “special efforts 
to promote freedom of religion.”16 Aside from the final approach of “special efforts,” the means 
to achieve the objectives clearly depict methods of leveraging national power. This chapter even 
cites specific instances of democratic transitioning that resulted from these uses of power. It 
notes such examples as the democracies of Eastern Europe that formed after the fall of the Soviet 
Union (even as recently as Belgrade in 2000), democratic allies in Asia (Taiwan and South 
Korea), and the evolution of Latin American and African authoritarian regimes towards 
democracies with the exchange of generals for elected leaders.
17
 
A third example of clearly defined means and ends is illustrated by the chapter “Ignite a 
New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade.” Means of 
advancing economic objectives include domestic policies such as lowering taxes, promoting 




expansion. However, the economic interests of the United States are also secured through global 
cooperation. This includes strong connections and trade frameworks with American allies, 
including Europe and Japan. The sections on global trade detail specific regulations for 
constructing an international market of free and fair trade through such legislation and 
organizations as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Trade Act of 2002, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
18
 These examples of 
ends and means demonstrate the core of the 2002 National Security Strategy and begin to 
develop it as a true strategic plan. 
Clearly depicting and correlating ends and means set the 2002 NSS on the path towards 
fulfilling the requirements stipulated in Section 603 of Goldwater-Nichols. The first requirement 
of describing the interests, goals, and objectives of the United States is undoubtedly 
accomplished. Individual chapters dedicated to each objective elaborate on goals and methods to 
achieve them.  
The second requirement pertaining to foreign policy commitments, while not as plainly 
stated in its own section as that of previous administrations, is also fulfilled in the 2002 NSS. 
The chapter “Work With Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” best exemplifies this through its 
discussion of foreign relations with and commitments to other states. This chapter, as is common 
throughout the 2002 NSS, is concise and direct. It describes American foreign relations broadly 
in a regional construct. However, it supplements these broad characterizations with specific 
cases. For instance, the document touts administration efforts towards building strong bilateral 
relations with Pakistan and India. Through establishing connections with these nations, the Bush 
Administration hoped to advance American interests such as combating terrorism and 




the two nations that contained the potential to destabilize the entire region.
19
 This section also 
details specific relationships with other nations such as with Indonesia and Colombia. This 
chapter of the 2002 NSS completes the second Goldwater-Nichols requirement. 
The NSS also completes the third requirement of proposing short-term and long-term 
uses of national power. Short-term uses of national power include immediately deterring 
terrorism and taking action against rogue states that harbor them. As a short-term objective, this 
was demonstrated by the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. This short-term objective became a long-
term objective as described in the 2002 NSS, which stated that “Afghanistan has been liberated; 
coalition forces continue to hunt down the Taliban and al-Qaida.”20 The United States quickly 
invaded Afghanistan, ending the Taliban controlled government. However, while one goal was 
completed in the short-term, the Bush Administration and the nation found out that eradicating 
the al-Qaida and Taliban threat would be a much more long-term goal. President Bush most 
likely did not intend for the War in Afghanistan to continue for over a decade, but it was clear 
even in September of 2002 that “winning” the war would be a long-term objective. 
The fourth requirement of Section 603 stipulates that the NSS consider the capabilities of 
the United States to implement the national strategy. The Bush Administration addressed the 
shortcomings of the federal government in coping with the 9/11 attacks and sought to correct 
these deficiencies through policy initiatives described in the 2002 National Security Strategy: 
This Administration has proposed the largest government reorganization since the 
Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of 
Defense. Centered on a new Department of Homeland Security and including a new 
unified military command and a fundamental reordering of the FBI, our comprehensive 
plan to secure the homeland encompasses every level of government and the cooperation 
of the public and the private sector. This strategy will turn adversity into opportunity. For 
example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with 




just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers. Our border controls 




This section notes the shortcomings of American capabilities in addressing the new era 
challenges of terrorism and WMDs confronting the United States. President Bush proposed 
policy initiatives to address these deficiencies. These included the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
was signed by President Bush on October 26, 2001, and the Homeland Security Act, which 
would be enacted on November 25, 2002. Including evaluations such as the above example of 
American capabilities fulfilled the fourth and final requirement of Section 603. 
 As many of the Tenets of Strategic Planning mirror the requirements of Section 603, 
some of the tenets have already been met. The first tenet of incorporating aspects of national 
power beyond military force is achieved through diplomacy and economic objectives previously 
discussed. The 2002 NSS meets the second tenet of plausible expectations through the formerly 
elaborated evaluation of capabilities. The third tenet of explicitly defined objectives and means 
has been fulfilled through the eight chapters devoted to describing goals and how to achieve 
them. The fourth tenet is accounted for through the utilization of short-term and long-term 
objectives as previously mentioned. 
The fifth tenet, accounting for public opinion, has yet to be covered through the 
discussion of Goldwater-Nichols requirements. In the 2002 NSS, President Bush directly 
acknowledges the importance of taking the will of the people into account. The NSS notes that 
“history has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of 
their people.”22 By commenting that history scorns nations that fail to appreciate the significance 
of the will of the people, President Bush conversely implies that people should be a central 




acknowledgment that the will of the people should be accounted for. However, even though he 
acknowledges its significance, President Bush fails to directly appeal to public opinion in the 
manner that his predecessors chose.  
The 2002 NSS appeal for public approval is not explicit; it claims that preemptive action 
is necessary to protect the homeland. It is assumed that in directing all action towards protecting 
America, the citizenry will approve. Furthermore, the Bush Administration also assumed that the 
moral justification of its cause would equate to winning over public approval for its strategic 
plan. The NSS stresses the significance of the threat to American citizens, noting that “the targets 
of these [terrorist] attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation 
of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on 
September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists…”23 The NSS 
later states that “our most important priority is to protect the homeland for the American 
people.”24 Here the document makes clear that protecting America is the central objective of the 
Bush Administration. This illuminates the fact that the threat is imminent and the president will 
act in accordance with the assumed wishes of Americans to protect the United States. The NSS 
declares that the president must utilize preemptive action in order to achieve the peace that 
American citizens desire, stating that “given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United 
States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter 
a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that 
could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let 
our enemies strike first.”25 The president has clearly made his case that terrorist threats abound 
and that for him to protect Americans (which it is assumed that this objective would meet with 




 President Bush’s assumption of public approval for the utilization of preemptive action 
garnered much criticism. Most notably, the essayist Wendell Barry authored an article decrying 
the inherent undemocratic characteristics of Bush’s preemptive doctrine in the 2002 NSS:  
The idea of a government acting alone in preemptive war is inherently undemocratic, for 
it does not require or even permit the president to obtain the consent of the governed. As 
a policy, this new strategy depends on the acquiescence of a public kept fearful and 
ignorant, subject to manipulation by the executive power, and on the compliance of an 
intimidated and office-dependent legislature. Even within the narrow logic of warfare, 
there is a substantial difference between a defensive action, for which the reason would 
be publicly known, and a preemptive or aggressive action, for which the reason would be 
known only by a few at the center of power. The responsibilities of the president 
obviously are not mine, and so I hesitate to doubt absolutely the necessity of 
governmental secrecy. But I feel no hesitation in saying that, to the extent that a 
government is secret, it cannot be democratic or its people free. By this new doctrine, the 
president alone may start a war against any nation at any time, and with no more 




Barry’s critique is thoughtful and well-argued. He makes the case that preemptive action occurs 
in secrecy, which is inherently undemocratic and implicitly works against the will of the people. 
Yet, as Bush argued, the will of the people is that first the government protects them from all 
threats. In the 2002 NSS, Bush claims that preemptive action is necessary for this protection to 
occur effectively. The opposing opinions of Bush and Barry demonstrate the ambiguity over how 
to interpret public opinion in this rare instance of American history. 
 Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the illusion of American invulnerability as 
the last remaining superpower was shattered. With this revelation of susceptibility Americans 
entrusted more power to their government and inevitably this resulted in a loss of individual 
liberty. President Bush initiated two wars and oversaw the passage of numerous laws restricting 
the rights of Americans. However, this all arguably occurred in the interest of national security, 




with elegant arguments like Wendell Barry’s, it is not too much to assume that the public largely 
approved of the measures. The most obvious gauge of the public’s approval of President Bush 
was his successful reelection in 2004, where he was the first candidate since his father’s 1988 
election to carry the majority of the popular vote.
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 Therefore, while he does not explicitly make 
a direct appeal to the people in the 2002 NSS, Bush justifiably assumes that he acts in their 
interest. The continued political support seems to confirm that, through his preemption doctrine, 
he acted with public approval. 
 The next tenet addressed by the 2002 NSS is that strategic planning must account for the 
actions of other actors. By now, it should be markedly clear that the NSS accounts for other 
actors as the core strategy of preemptive action revolves around reacting to outside actors (rouge 
states and terrorists). The NSS makes this point with a connection to its allies and accounting for 
their actions as well:  
While our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today’s 
globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the 
United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their 
obligations to fight terrorism. Where governments find the fight against terrorism beyond 
their capacities, we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help we 




This statement clearly takes into account the actions of America’s allies. However, the 2002 NSS 
goes even further by describing specific states, declaring that “we are attentive to the possible 
renewal of old patterns of great power competition. Several potential great powers are now in the 
midst of internal transition—most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent 
developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is 




does not act alone in the world, but that other states also have a choice to take action and affect 
American national strategy, thus satisfying the sixth Tenet of Strategic Planning. 
 The seventh tenet notes that there will always be friction and uncertainty; therefore a 
strategic plan should be flexible and adaptable over time. President Bush also acknowledges this 
limitation of strategic planning, stating in the 2002 NSS that “no doctrine can anticipate every 
circumstance in which U.S. action—direct or indirect—is warranted. We have finite political, 
economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities.”30 Strategic planning has 
constraints determined by humanity’s lack of omniscience and physical limitations of resources. 
However, the 2002 NSS successfully fulfills this tenet through its iteration in the 2006 NSS, 
which adapts Bush Administration strategy to the friction that arises. 
 The 2006 National Security Strategy follows the same basic goals found in its 
predecessor: “promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity” with America leading “a growing 
community of democracies.”31 The 2006 NSS also follows the same structure as the previous 
document, including the same chapter titles. This NSS features an update by dividing each 
chapter into three sections: part A summarizes the 2002 NSS; Part B details successes and 
challenges faced since the 2002 NSS; and Part C updates the goals and means for pursuing them. 
While the structure of each chapter may have been altered, this is a clear example of a successful 
iteration of strategic planning. Each chapter in the 2006 NSS refers to its predecessor, maintains 
similar wording where possible, and updates the ends and means to reflect contextual changes. 
However, some of the updates have created entirely new sections that the previous document did 
not contain. 
 President Bush commences the preface with a warning to the American people. He 




grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and 
murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our 
most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people.”32 This direct opening 
sets a tone for the updates to the NSS; the new phrasing is more direct and has a harsher wartime 
tone. Furthermore, two new sections have been included that discuss the strategy for the two 
wars that the United States is involved in (Iraq and Afghanistan). The first section, “Afghanistan 
and Iraq: The Front Lines in the War on Terror” briefly describes the strategies in the war on 
terror as it pertains to the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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 Another new section, “Iraq and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” explains the logic behind going to war with Iraq, why the Bush 
Administration was wrong in its intelligence estimate, and how the administration will correct 
the deficiencies that led to such a wrongly informed decision.
34
 These wartime changes are 
incorporated into the updates and fit with the iteration, though they receive more emphasis than 
some of the other minor changes. 
 The 2006 NSS also includes one new chapter titled “Engage the Opportunities and 
Confront the Challenges of Globalization.” This chapter broadens President Bush’s conception 
of national security to include such transnational concerns as: public health challenges 
(HIV/AIDS, avian influenza); illicit trade (human trafficking, drugs); and environmental 
disasters (hurricanes, tsunamis).
35
 With this wider view, President Bush adds to the 2006 NSS 
and retains the core structure of the 2002 NSS. 
 Aside from a few updates and additions, the 2006 NSS maintains the core strategic 
planning of the 2002 NSS. As a result, this iteration fulfills the Tenets of Strategic Planning with 




aptly demonstrates the seventh tenet of a strategic plan, containing a level of flexibility and 
adaptation, thus fulfilling the tenets for both National Security Strategies. 
 President Bush successfully published two National Security Strategies that adhered to 
the requirements of Goldwater-Nichols and fulfilled the Tenets of Strategic Planning. These two 
National Security Strategies are proper strategic plans, thus continuing the legacy of previous 
administrations. However, the Bush Doctrine took national strategy in a radically new direction. 
Christine Gray, a University Lecturer at Cambridge, commented that “much of the [2002] 
National Security Strategy is not new. The tone is populist, the language simple. There is much 
stress on cooperation in the prevention of terrorism. But on the use of force the message is stark 
and revolutionary.”36 The Bush Doctrine’s utilization of preemptive force challenged the 
established norms governing international relations. President Bush argued that this new 
direction was necessary to confront the new challenges facing the United States. In the end, the 
Bush Administration successfully formulated two iterations of proper strategic planning around 
this principle. 
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CONCLUSION: TRENDS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING 
 
Success will require approaches that can be sustained and achieve results. One of the 
reasons that this nation succeeded in the second half of the 20th century was its capacity 
to pursue policies and build institutions that endured across multiple Administrations, 
while also preserving the flexibility to endure setbacks and to make necessary 
adjustments. 
—Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010 
 
 
 This thesis attempted to discern whether or not a theoretical discussion of strategy could 
lead to an analytical framework for qualifying strategic planning, and then whether or not that 
framework could be utilized to evaluate the National Security Strategies of the United States for 
their success or failure in representing proper strategic plans. Through this assessment, it has 
become apparent that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
effectively established a guide for presidents to create a properly formatted strategic plan that 
erected means and ends around their strategic vision for America. Furthermore, the more 
stringent analytical framework, titled “Tenets of Strategic Planning,” extended the bounds of 
strategic planning to incorporate additional requirements beyond the traditional definition of 
national strategy. The chapter “Introduction” commenced this inquisition with three guiding 
questions for the discussion of qualifying American National Security Strategies. 
The first question inquired as to whether or not, with the president annually directing 
national strategy, Congress through Goldwater-Nichols effectively communicated to the 
president how to create national strategy. As noted in the chapter “On Strategy,” Section 603 of 




plan. An NSS must include: interests, goals, and objectives; foreign policy and worldwide 
commitments relating to national security; short-term and long-term uses of economic, political, 
military, and other aspects of national power to achieve interests, goals, and objectives; and an 
evaluation of U.S. capabilities to carry out the national strategy.
1
 The analysis of the Reagan, 
Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II NSSs demonstrated that, with the exception of the 1993 NSS, each 
president utilized this set of directives to properly construct National Security Strategies 
incorporating the Goldwater-Nichols foundations for strategic planning.  
 The second question asked if Goldwater-Nichols resulted in the annual creation of true 
strategic plans. The answer to this is “yes and no.” Yes, each administration from Ronald Reagan 
through George W. Bush developed true strategic plans adhering to the foundational principles in 
Goldwater-Nichols. Furthermore, these documents also passed the more stringent test of the 
Tenets of Strategic Planning. Additionally, they fundamentally followed the definition of 
national strategy: utilizing various aspects of national power in order to achieve short-term and 
long-term national interests and objectives directed at international competitors throughout peace 
and war. Unfortunately, Goldwater-Nichols did not establish a mechanism for ensuring that these 
aptly-constructed strategic plans would be delivered to Congress and the public on an annual 
basis. As demonstrated by the case study chapters, every president except for Reagan failed to 
deliver consistent reports. Therefore, “no,” Goldwater-Nichols did not result in the annual 
creation of true strategic plans. 
 The final question, which was partially discussed by the previous question, asks if all of 
the National Security Strategies qualify as proper strategic plans. The answer, as previously 
established, is “yes,” all but the 1993 NSS qualify as proper strategic plans. They all follow the 




of ends and means with appraisals of international commitments and national capabilities, and 
thus fulfills the first four Tenets of Strategic Planning. As demonstrated by the 1993 NSS, 
without this strategic core, true strategic planning cannot take place. However, this thesis argues 
that true strategic planning goes further than this strategic core and includes additional elements 
as addressed by the final three Tenets of Strategic Planning.  
The fifth tenet notes that proper strategic planning takes public opinion (also known as 
the will of the people) into account. Most administrations accomplished this through a direct 
appeal for public approval. Ronald Reagan followed this methodology by calling on the 
American people to unite behind a strategy directed at defeating the Soviet threat. Reagan 
wanted public consensus and Congressional support for his approach to containment. In the 
trappings of the Cold War, Reagan found an easy bid for public approval through the “us-
against-them” mentality. 
 George H. W. Bush, writing his first NSS at the beginning of the Soviet Union’s demise, 
dedicated an entire chapter to discussing this issue. In the 1990 NSS’s chapter “A Public Trust” 
he justified his strategy to the American public. Following Reagan’s lead, he also asserted that 
public opinion favored his national strategy. This notion of public consensus was repeated in the 
1991 NSS, which discarded the chapter-long justification of strategy and public appeal. Though 
he abandoned the lengthy justification, Bush still contended that national unity behind his foreign 
policy and international actions (especially in the Gulf War) demonstrated public approval for 
his national strategy. 
 Bill Clinton also considered public opinion throughout all of his National Security 
Strategies. He argued that the National Security Strategies were justifications of his strategic 




through placing the needs of the people at the core of American foreign policy. Therefore, with 
public approval for his national strategy, Clinton argued that Congress should also come forward 
with bipartisan support for his strategic initiatives. 
 George W. Bush also noted the importance of accounting for the will of the people in 
constructing a national strategy. In the 2002 NSS, Bush asserted that this should be a central 
consideration for any leader. However, unlike his predecessors, he never explicitly articulated a 
direct appeal to the people in the 2002 NSS. The 2002 NSS implies that public consensus is 
unified behind Bush’s national strategy. The argument follows logical reasoning, such as that the 
public wants to be protected from terrorists. Furthermore, since this protection necessitates in 
some cases preemptive action, the people would therefore also approve of preemptive military 
force to stop a terrorist threat. Additionally, Bush’s argument for having public approval seemed 
to be affirmed by his 2004 reelection where he was the first president to win the majority of the 
popular vote since his father’s 1998 election. The 2006 NSS iteration repeats the implied bid for 
public approval of the 2002 NSS. 
 Overall, administrations utilized the National Security Strategies to establish a consensus 
for public approval of their national strategies. They most commonly incorporated direct rhetoric 
appealing to the domestic audience to achieve this. Don M. Snider, a visiting professor at the 
Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, noted that the American public looked toward 
the National Security Strategies for “coherence and farsightedness in the security policies of their 
government: a strategy they could, as citizens, fully support.”2 Ultimately, the people desire a 
national strategy reflecting their interests and ideals. It is the president’s job to convince the 
people that his strategy represents their interests, and is one the attentive citizen can support. 




 The sixth tenet addresses the fact that strategic planning does not occur in a vacuum, but 
that other actors whose actions will affect any strategic plan. Each administration framed its NSS 
around some sort of international competitor, usually through an acknowledgment of a direct 
threat to national interests. These other actors worked towards their own ends and threatened to 
derail American national strategy. NSSs across the four administrations consistently identified 
these actors as any combination of: the Soviet Union (later Russia), terrorists, and hostile nations 
(usually China, North Korea, and Iran). The National Security Strategies also accounted for 
actions of American allies, normally condensed into an appraisal of NATO actions and interests. 
Each NSS considered in the case studies of this thesis contained this common approach to 
addressing the sixth tenet. 
 After qualifying National Security Strategies across four presidencies for their strategic 
content, it becomes apparent that they achieved much success through addressing the final tenet, 
which declared that true strategic planning necessitates flexibility and adaptability. While the 
original intent of Goldwater-Nichols’ annual strategic report requirement was to couple it with 
the president’s annual budget in order to reign in defense spending, it later became clear that 
consistent reevaluations of strategy were necessary to ensure adequate strategic planning.
3
 
Strategists do not have crystal balls; they can do no more than offer informed predictions of 
future events. As such, the plans that they develop need to be revisited to account for the friction, 
chance, or other unknown variables in strategic planning that they simply could not account for 
when the plans were written. Certain administrations understood this concept better than others. 
 The Reagan Administration never had the opportunity to develop successive iterations of 
strategy. While Reagan was able to publish two consecutive strategic plans, the pressure was on 




period. Reagan’s first attempt met the basic requirements, though it clearly needed improvement. 
It is with his second attempt that Reagan set the standard for future administrations on how to 
translate strategy from year-to-year while also establishing the basic framework for constructing 
National Security Strategies. 
 George H. W. Bush followed Reagan’s lead in the structure and format of his first two 
National Security Strategies. He also utilized the iterative process to lend continuity to strategy 
while adapting to unforeseen events. However, Bush was also the only president to present an 
absolute atrocity of strategic planning in the guise of an NSS with his 1993 strategy report. Yet, 
aside from this momentary lapse in strategy, the Reagan example continued through Bush and 
into the next administration. 
 William Clinton adhered more than any other president to the intended spirit of 
Goldwater-Nichols’ Section 603. He was the best and most consistent at coming close to 
publishing deadlines. Additionally, he most aptly demonstrated the iterative process of strategic 
planning, producing seven consecutive National Security Strategies. Following his 1996 
reelection, Clinton’s strategies underwent a title and format change, though they retained all the 
same elements that comprised his previous plans. Essentially, the strategy remained the same, 
but was refurbished to update its appeal. Aside from aesthetic considerations, Clinton followed 
the iterative pattern begun by Reagan and improved by Bush. However, he was to be the last 
president to do so. 
 President George W. Bush only produced a single NSS during his first term in office. 
This was the lowest record for any administration, including Reagan’s, which was able to 
produce two National Security Strategies in his final two years in office. However, 




very easily be assumed that any NSSs produced at this time would have required major revision 
(if not totally discarded) following the 9/11 terrorist attack. This pardon aside, from the 2002 
NSS Bush made it apparent that he was going to alter the entire NSS process. Though his 2002 
NSS carried over the basic national interests and values from previous administrations, it did not 
conform to any of the structural or format models of previous versions. It redefined how national 
strategy was presented. Furthermore, it very nearly failed in this measure from not continuing the 
iterative process. 
 The publication of the 2006 NSS qualified Bush’s two strategic plans to meet the seventh 
tenet by the smallest margin. If he had not been reelected, he would have completely failed to 
meet this requirement. However, at its most fundamental level, the bridging of the 2002 and 
2006 NSS creates an iterative adaptability for President Bush’s strategic planning. Delaying the 
written articulation of strategy to once every four years completely goes against the spirit of 
Goldwater-Nichols and takes the time span between publications to the limit of being considered 
iteration. Situations change constantly and can drastically influence strategic planning. As such, 
a strategic plan loses credibility the longer it goes without an update to account for changing 
events. Unfortunately, Bush set a new trend in strategic planning by reducing the NSS from an 
annual reappraisal of strategy to a single strategic statement for each term of office. 
 At the time of writing this thesis in March of 2012, Barrack Obama has followed George 
W. Bush’s lead in creating a single National Security Strategy in his first term.4 Obama’s 2010 
NSS is his only comprehensive publication of national strategy and, going into the beginning of 
campaign season for his second term, it is very likely that this will be his only NSS for this term. 








 Overall, the iterative process provided a method for successfully adapting strategic 
planning. Maintaining a consistent requirement would help to keep pressure on future 
administrations to meet the submission deadline, thus continuing the iterative process. Of course, 
previous administrations have largely disregarded any sort of deadline, but this is where 
Congress needs to step in and assert its authority. The annual requirement is quite clear in 
Goldwater-Nichols, and the president should be held accountable for executing the duties 
prescribed to him under the law.  
Additionally, the iterative process produced a positive side effect of causing 
administrations to consistently review strategy. By reviewing national strategy annually, most 
presidents transferred the core components of the document (often word-for-word) from one 
NSS to the next. This created a connection and progression of strategy throughout each 
president’s time in office. Longevity of strategic planning is preferential to ad hoc planning, 
lending coherence and consistency to the progression. Longevity in planning began with NSC-
68. However, until Goldwater-Nichols there was no procedure to ensure that written articulations 
of strategy would continue with any regularity while maintaining a core structure to give the 
iterative process a sense of coherence. Goldwater-Nichols sought to correct this aspect of 
strategic planning by requiring an annual report. 
 Scholars have also speculated on the annual requirement of Goldwater-Nichols 
concerning National Security Strategies. Don M. Snider argued that the United States suffers 
from a failure of long-term planning. According to Snider, long-term planning places a far 




However, he admitted that administrations have been successful in “episodic planning,” or 
planning for the next 4-6 months. Snider went on to assert that Executive Branch comprehensive 
strategic planning (he describes the NSS process, but does not call his suggestion by that name) 
should be undertaken on the first and third years of a president’s administration. He then further 
clarified, that if no major external events occur to derail the strategy, this comprehensive review 
may take place only once during the first year of a term.
6
 This contradicts his previous argument 
that administrations have only been successful at short-term “episodic planning” and have failed 
to produce long-term strategy. If they have yet to prove able at long-term planning, how does it 
then seem plausible to conclude that planning should take place even less frequently than it 
already does? 
 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Reilly, a U.S. Army Strategist and graduate of the Army 
War College, largely agreed with Snider’s overall appraisal of the Goldwater-Nichols annual 
strategic report requirement. He noted that the submission process has a mixed record for success 
in terms of meeting the annual deadline. This mixed record may result from the limited period 
facing an incoming administration that has to additionally deal with the complications arising 
from having to re-staff all of the key cabinet and departmental positions upon entering office. 
Reilly also contends that the annual submission creates too much work for the administration to 
deliver a strategic report to Congress on time. Furthermore, a staggering of submission deadlines 
would allow the administration time to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy it already had in 
place. Therefore, like Snider, he recommended a biannual submission of the report, except that 
he changed the deadlines to the second and fourth years of the administration.
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 While Snider and Reilly’s arguments appear quite convincing at first glance, certain 




Clinton’s, George W. Bush’s, and Barack Obama’s first terms in office, it is apparent that Reilly 
is correct in noting the lack of success in producing a strategic plan in the first year. It is 
commonly understood that the first year for any administration is fraught with filling 
appointments and a huge learning curve for all of the new staff, the president not excluded. 
Therefore, it may be in the best interest of strategy to give the administration time to settle in and 
develop its strategic vision before being required to set it in the “unforgiving medium of cold 
type.”8 
 After the correct assertion that first year strategic planning should be avoided, Reilly’s 
argument loses traction. Continually reevaluating strategic planning should not be considered too 
much work. As previously noted, part of the success of the iterative process is that the core 
components and vision of strategic plans are carried over from document-to-document in order 
to establish strategic longevity. Strategic plans necessitate only minor updates from year-to-year; 
this should not over burden the NSC or other administration strategists. The most difficult NSS 
to produce would, by this reasoning, be the initial NSS. Accepting Reilly’s argument abolishing 
the first year requirement would give the administration a full year after the January 20 
inauguration to develop the initial NSS and to have its submission coincide with the annual 
budget. Following this logic, each administration could produce three iterative National Security 
Strategies per term. Furthermore, this would also give the administration a reprieve from having 
to expend time developing an NSS during what is either a campaign or lame-duck final year. 
From previous administrations, it is apparent that creating an NSS during this final year rarely 
occurs and, when it does, it is either a transcription of a previous NSS as in the case of Clinton’s 




Reilly’s third argument, that staggering the deadline would result in more accurate 
appraisals of the effectiveness of an NSS, fails to account for the fact that time continues to move 
forward even if the strategist pauses. While strategic plans should be evaluated, strategic 
planning is a constant process of adaptation. This is not a game where participants may be 
granted extra time to review their plans. As the sixth tenet notes, strategy does not occur in a 
vacuum; outside actors continue on a course of action even if American strategic planning does 
not. A strategic plan must be constantly evaluated and redefined to keep up with international 
events and, ideally, keep ahead of the opponent. Additional time off, while useful for intellectual 
exercises, may not be a sound argument for strategist-presidents. Furthermore, this becomes an 
even weaker construct if one accepts Snider’s first argument that administrations are only 
successful in short-term planning. Hypothetically, if results from an evaluation of biannual 
strategic planning were taken, they would most likely note something along the lines that the 
NSS was short sighted and lacked longevity from the two-year gap in planning.  
Overall, the National Security Strategies succeed from their reevaluations and adaptations 
to changing events. The iterative process lends a coherence and longevity to strategic planning. 
While Reilly and Snider were correct that the annual requirement necessitated reassessment, 
their assertion of its success through biennial publication is misguided. However, Reilly’s 
argument for avoiding strategic planning during the first year and campaign season is well-
founded and a fitting recommendation for future success. Reilly also observed that the annual 
requirement led to mixed results. This is true that most administrations published the documents 
sporadically (aside from Reagan and Clinton). Part of the reasoning for this has already been 
addressed. However, it should be noted that if future requirements adopt the NSS publication 




the deadline. Congress created the law and it has failed to address the fact that presidents have 
not abided by it. If future administrations are held responsible for producing strategy according 
to the recommendations provided, American strategic planning will become a coherent, 
consistent, and successful process. 
Over the course of the last sixty-five years, the American strategy-making process has 
evolved from an ad hoc process into a well-defined procedure. The National Security Act 
provided the impetus for ad hoc strategic planning. Goldwater-Nichols offered direction and a 
system for consistent and successful iterative strategic development. The Tenets of Strategic 
Planning further qualified American National Security Strategies from 1987 to 2006 as 
containing the necessary elements to be considered proper strategy.
9
 
This thesis presents the strategy-making process as a rather straightforward endeavor. 
However, strategy is a difficult concept to define and an even more difficult notion to put into 
practice. Historian MacGregor Knox of the London School of Economics pondered the 
complexities and pitfalls of the strategy-making process: 
 Ultimately, makers of strategy must narrow their focus; too much complexity makes the 
mind seize. At a minimum they must see clearly both themselves and potential 
adversaries, their strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, and limits – through humility, 
relentless and historically informed critical analysis, and restless dissatisfaction even in 
victory. They must weigh imponderables through structured debates that pare away 
personal, organizational, and national illusions and conceits. They must squarely address 
issues that are bureaucratic orphans. They must unerringly discern and prepare to strike 
the enemy’s jugular – whether by surprise attack or by attrition, in war or in political and 
economic struggle. And in the end, makers of strategy must cheerfully face the 




Knox illustrates some of the challenges that confront strategists. However, the basic strategic 
principles discussed in this thesis provide a foundation for creating an effective system that will 
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TENETS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING 
 
1. Strategy must look beyond military force and utilize all available resources. 
2. A strategy needs to be plausible in expectations for capabilities and available resources. 
3. A plan needs to explicitly define objectives and correlating means. 
4. Planning should include short-term and long-term objectives; it should exhibit a 
longevity that extends beyond crisis-management. 
5. A strategist should account for public opinion in developing a strategic plan and 
anticipate the enemy to do the same.  
6. Strategic planning should not occur in a vacuum; a strategist must account for the actions 
of other actors including allies and enemies. 
7. There will always be friction and uncertainty; therefore, strategy should be flexible and 
adaptable over time. 




GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 
1986: SECTION 603 
 
SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
 
(a) ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL REORT. —(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: 
 
ANNUAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT 
 
SEC. 104. (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive 
report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section 
referred to as a ‘national security strategy report’). 
 
(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on 
which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 
1105 of title 31, United States Code. 
 
(b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security 
strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and 
discussion of the following: 
 
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that 
are vital to the national security of the United States. 
 
(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense 
capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to 
implement the national security strategy of the United States. 
 
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, 
military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to 
protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives 
referred to in paragraph (1). 
 
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the 
national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of 
the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of 
the United States to support the implementation of the national security 
strategy. 
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(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress 
on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States. 
 
(c) Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified 
and unclassified form. 
 
(2) The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the 
item relating to section 103 the following new item: 
 
“Sec. 104. Annual national security strategy report.” 
 
(b) REVISION OF ANNUAL SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT.—Subsection (e) of 
section 113 (as redesignated by section 101(a) of this Act) is amended to read as follows: 
 
(e)(1) The Secretary shall include in his annual report to Congress under subsection (c)— 
 
(A) A description of the major military missions and of the military force 
structure of the United States for the next fiscal year; 
 
(B) An explanation of the relationship of those military missions to that force 
structure; and 
 
(C) The justification for those military missions and that force structure. 
 
(2) In preparing the matter referred to in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall take into 
consideration the content of the annual national security strategy report of the President 
under section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 for the fiscal year concerned. 
